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ABSTRACT 
While design decisions determine the quality and viability of applications in general, in 
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), the decision for a suitable DLT design (e.g., 
Ethereum, IOTA) is of particular relevance because the retroactive change of the underlying 
DLT design is currently very hard and often even impossible. Extant research has revealed 
several trade-offs between DLT characteristics (e.g., availability vs. consistency). Such 
trade-offs inhibit a one-size-fits-all DLT design that suites the requirements of all 
applications on DLT. For an appropriate assessment of the suitability of DLT designs for a 
particular application on DLT, researchers and developers require a systematic and holistic 
overview of the functioning of different DLT designs, including their configuration of DLT 
characteristics as well as dependencies and resulting trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics. In this work, we present a comprehensive set of 49 DLT characteristics 
synthesized from the literature on DLT, which have been found relevant to consider when 
developing viable applications on DLT. Furthermore, we conducted an in-depth analysis of 
dependencies and resulting trade-offs between DLT characteristics. Finally, we 
consolidated the identified 26 trade-offs into 6 archetypes and explain implications for 
applications on DLT. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Software and its engineering → Software design tradeoffs 
KEYWORDS 
Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology, DLT, Software Engineering, Suitability, Viability 
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1 Introduction 
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has the potential to increase efficiency and transparency of 
collaborations between individuals and/or organizations [17,86,131] and, thus, significantly impacts 
economy, society, and everyday life. So far, applications on DLT have been developed in various domains 
such as finance [23], health care [30], and supply chain management [149]. For instance, in supply chain 
management, provenance tracking systems for diverse products employ DLT as a tamper-resistant data 
storage, which is replicated across multiple storage devices (nodes) of cooperating entities in the supply chain 
[89,93]. Each application on DLT builds upon a particular DLT design with unique characteristics (e.g., 
Ethereum [22] or IOTA [127]), which is a detailed description of a DLT concept (e.g., blockchain) [78]. A 
DLT design is used as a shared infrastructure and affords, for example, reliable, (almost) immutable data 
storage, real-time processing of transactions (e.g., for the transfer of digital assets), and automation of 
business processes [103,155,171,171].  
However, recent implementations of applications on DLT emphasize critical drawbacks of underlying DLT 
designs, which, for instance, result in low throughput, poor scalability, or high cost. To address these issues, 
developers and researchers reconfigured several DLT characteristics (e.g., block size, block creation interval) 
of DLT designs and investigated the respective impact on the behavior of the distributed ledger to better 
understand and tackle prevalent drawbacks of DLT designs for applications on DLT [53]. During prior 
studies, researchers revealed several dependencies between DLT characteristics in particular, such as block 
size and block creation interval, that must be considered for the implementation of DLT applications [78]. 
Such dependencies often result in trade-offs between DLT characteristics in a way that the improvement of 
a particular DLT characteristic impairs other DLT characteristics. For example, a trade-off exists between 
achieving availability and consistency [18]. High availability of the distributed ledger can be achieved by 
increasing the number of replications of the ledger. As a consequence, the network size of the distributed 
ledger increases, which will lead to impaired consistency due to longer propagation delays for network 
messages [54]. Due to prevalent trade-offs between DLT characteristics, there will not be a one-size-fits-all 
DLT design for applications on DLT but rather DLT designs that are specialized to fulfill certain 
requirements and agree on a set of trade-offs [78,173]. This makes it challenging for DLT developers to select 
fitting DLT designs for particular applications. It is necessary for developers to understand the drawbacks 
caused by trade-offs in DLT designs in advance because the choice of a DLT design strongly influences 
development, maintenance, and viability of the respective application on DLT. The high efforts to migrate 
data stored on a distributed ledger from one DLT design to another DLT design [114] make the decision of 
which DLT design fulfills the application requirements best even more crucial for the correct and viable 
functioning of envisioned applications on DLT (e.g., provenance tracking, electronic health records). 
Therefore, a sound understanding of possible drawbacks for a particular application on DLT, which are 
caused by the choice of a DLT design and the inherent trade-offs, is required to ensure viability of an 
envisioned application on DLT. To understand the trade-offs between DLT characteristics that cause the 
restricted applicability of DLT designs to use cases and for the efficient reconfiguration and development of 
DLT designs, a comprehensive analysis of dependencies between DLT characteristics and resulting trade-
offs is required. Yet, while practitioners and prior research have started to identify dependencies between 
DLT characteristics, we lack an understanding on the (negative) influence of dependencies on other DLT 
characteristics (e.g., integrity, traceability) and the resulting trade-offs. The impact of reconfigurations of 
DLT characteristics on the behavior of the respective DLT design remains unclear. Hence, we answer the 
following research question (RQ): 
 
RQ: How do trade-offs between DLT characteristics impact the viability of applications on DLT? 
 
To answer our RQ, we first conducted a comprehensive literature review to identify DLT characteristics and 
related dependencies between DLT characteristics. Then, we analyzed contradicting dependencies between 
DLT characteristics to identify trade-offs, which we further investigated to deepen understanding of the 
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causes for drawbacks for applications on DLT. Finally, we consolidated the identified trade-offs into 
archetypes to make the resulting drawbacks for applications on DLT more tangible. 
This work presents a consolidated list of 49 DLT characteristics that are fundamental for assessing the 
viability of DLT designs for applications on DLT. We further explain trade-offs between DLT characteristics, 
which inhibit a one-size-fits-all DLT design. Based on the identified dependencies and trade-offs between 
DLT characteristics, we discuss drawbacks for applications on DLT and, thus, contribute to the development 
of viable applications on DLT. Finally, we present seven archetypes of DLT designs to make the identified 
trade-offs between DLT characteristics and resulting drawbacks for applications on DLT more 
comprehensible. This work forms a bridge between currently separated research streams on DLT such as 
technical analysis, use cases identification, and decision support in the choice of a DLT design. 
We support an understanding of drawbacks for applications on DLT that result from the choice of a certain 
configuration of DLT characteristics. Thus, practitioners and researchers can better assess drawbacks of 
applications on DLT caused by the selected DLT designs. Furthermore, we link currently distinct research 
streams in the field of DLT (e.g., technical analysis and application development). Thus, we contribute to 
scientific knowledge by making it possible to set DLT characteristics into relation with applications on DLT 
and vice versa. 
The manuscript is structured as follows. First, we introduce the current state of research on DLT and set our 
research into context. In doing so we outline several attacks on distributed ledgers and smart contract 
vulnerabilities because this knowledge is required to understand the particular relevance of trade-offs 
between DLT characteristics and drawbacks for applications on DLT. Second, we describe the applied 
methodology. Third, we present the identified DLT characteristics, the derived trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics, and the generated archetypes. Fourth, we discuss our principle findings, summarize the 
implications for both practice and research, discuss research limitations, and give an outlook for future 
research. 
2 Related Research 
2.1 Distributed Ledger Technology 
DLT enables the operation of a highly-available, append-only database (referred to as distributed ledger) in 
an untrustworthy environment [167], where separated storage devices (referred to as nodes) maintain a local 
replication of the data stored on the ledger. An untrustworthy environment is characterized by the arbitrary 
occurrence of Byzantine failures [88] such as crashed or (temporarily) unreachable nodes, network delays, 
and malicious behavior of nodes (i.e., issuing wrong information). DLT serves as a shared, digital 
infrastructure for applications on DLT (e.g., financial transactions [77], provenance tracking [89]). Nodes are 
maintained and, thus, controlled by individuals or organizations, which we consider node controllers in the 
following. 
In DLT, data is transferred and appended to the ledger in the form of transactions and stored in a 
chronologically-ordered sequence. Each transaction contains meta-data (e.g., receiver address, timestamp) 
and a digital representation of certain assets or program code of a smart contract (see chapter 2.2) [22]. When 
a node receives a new transaction, the transaction is validated. The validation incorporates a proof of 
ownership for the particular asset (i.e., coins), which is why digital signatures and public key cryptography 
is applied [22,109]. For example, as a transaction, Alice has sent a certain amount of coins, which is validated 
by Bob’s node. After a transaction has been found valid, the transaction is forwarded to all adjacent nodes, 
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which also validate and forward the transaction subsequently. In this way a transaction is disseminated across 
nodes of a distributed ledger until each node eventually received the transaction. 
DLT draws from the concept of Replicated State Machines (RSMs), where each node maintains a local 
replication of the ledger in a certain state sn with an incrementing counter n ∈ ℕ0, which expresses the height 
of a ledger (also called block height in blockchain). Appending new data to the local replication of the ledger 
represents a transition from a state sn to the subsequent state sn+1. For example, if Alice owns 10 coins in sn 
and she sends 2 coins to Bob, Alice initiates a transition from sn to sn+1, in which Alice has a new balance of 
8 coins and Bob’s balance is increased by 2 coins. Since all nodes of a distributed ledger maintain a local 
replication of the ledger, all nodes must be synchronized and agree on a common state of the distributed 
ledger to reach consistency (i.e., agreeing that Bob’s balance increased). For this purpose a consensus 
mechanism is employed [109,110]. A consensus mechanism is used to manage the negotiation between 
nodes, which eventually agree on a common state of the ledger. Consensus mechanisms build upon trust 
models, which consider threats and uncertainties in the process of consensus finding such as Byzantine 
failures. Trust models form a set of assumptions, which must hold to assure consensus finding among nodes 
(e.g., at least 51 % of nodes must agree on a certain state). 
In large-scale distributed ledgers (e.g., Bitcoin [109]), where nodes can join and leave the network arbitrarily, 
it is not possible to reach consensus among all nodes before new data is finally added to the ledger [124]. 
Thus, newly appended data is not finalized but the data cannot be altered or removed to a certain probability, 
which is why only probabilistic finality is given [138]. The probability of data being finalized increases as 
more blocks (or transactions) are appended to the distributed ledger after the particular transaction. Therefore, 
the trust model of DLT designs such as Bitcoin incorporates network partitions by design, in which some 
nodes may agree on a state sn,1 and others agree on sn,2 with sn,1 ≠ sn,2. This phenomenon of network partitions 
which maintain different states respectively is called a fork. There can be an arbitrary number of forks in a 
distributed ledger at the same time. Forks are resolved by a so called fork resolution rules (e.g., in Bitcoin 
the longest chain rule [109]), which decide for a certain state of the ledger and, thus, brings the system in a 
consistent state. In contrast to probabilistic finality, there is total finality (or just finality), where all nodes 
agree on the new state before the data is appended to the ledger [24]. Once appended, data cannot be altered 
or removed anymore and forks such as in Bitcoin [109] or Ethereum [22] are unlikely or even not possible. 
DLT covers various DLT concepts, DLT designs, DLT properties and DLT characteristics [63,78]. For 
illustration of our terminology in DLT, we present a hierarchical structure of the important DLT terms in 
Figure 1. DLT concepts describe the basic structure and functioning of DLT designs in an abstract way. For 
instance, blockchain is a concept describing the usage of linked blocks that form a chain. Each block contains 
multiple transactions that have been added into the block by the nodes. Other DLT concepts do not use blocks 
at all; instead, for example, the DLT concept blockDAG links generated blocks in a directed acyclic graph 
Figure 1: Overview of DLT Terminology including DLT concepts, DLT designs, DLT properties, and DLT 
characteristics 
Throughput ...
Performance
...Confident ialityAvailability
Security
Spectre...
TDAGblockDAG
...
...
Ethereum
Blockchain
IOTA ...
Dist ributed Ledger Technology
DLT Concept
DLT Design
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(DAG), while in a transaction-based DAGs (TDAG) transactions are linked directly with each other1. DLT 
designs extend the abstract description of DLT concepts by adding concrete values and processes for inherent 
DLT characteristics such as a maximum block size. There are significant differences between DLT designs 
that make DLT designs suitable for some applications and unsuitable for others. For instance, the DLT design 
Bitcoin creates a new block every 10 minutes and comes at a block size of 1 MB [109]. In contrast, the DLT 
design Ethereum publishes new blocks every 17 seconds while block size is determined by a fee (so called 
gas) for executing transactions. The fee is voted up or down by each node individually. Each DLT design 
shares the same DLT properties, which are groups of DLT characteristics. For instance, throughput and 
scalability are both associated with the DLT property performance. Although all DLT designs cover all DLT 
properties, DLT designs must not cover all DLT characteristics. For instance, TDAGs do not use blocks and 
do not feature any DLT characteristics related to blocks (e.g., block size, block creation interval).  
In public, unpermissioned DLT designs such as Bitcoin [109], there is an incentive mechanism, which 
employs a reward scheme for nodes that participate in the validation of blocks and transaction, consenus 
finding, and maintainance of the distributed ledger. For example, nodes in the Bitcoin network receive a 
certain amount of coins if they have first mined a valid new block. The participation of nodes in a distributed 
ledger to receive a reward is called mining. Accordingly, the validating nodes are referred to as miners. Such 
incentive mechanisms are predominantly applied to distributed ledgers that employ nodes of unknown node 
controllers and, thus, allow for a high level of decentralization. A distributed ledger’s level of decentralization 
is determined by two dimensions: the number of independent node controllers (e.g., companies, individuals) 
and the number of validating nodes (see Figure 2). 
Despite the widespread distinction between public and permissioned DLT design (e.g., [102,121]) or public, 
consortium, and private DLT design (e.g., [169]), we use a more granular terminology to make the trade-offs 
in the following chapter unambiguous (in line with [158]). Thus, we distinguish between public and private 
DLT designs depending on the fact if a new node can directly join a network (referred to as public DLT) or 
if a permission must be granted first (referred to as private DLT). Public and private DLT designs can be 
distinguished into unpermissioned and permissioned. Nodes can either all have the same permission or must 
first be granted permission to validate and commit new data, usually both at the same time. The used 
terminology is summarized in Table 1. 
                                                          
1 Although blockchain represents a special type of blockDAG, we decided to separate blockchain from blockDAGs because of the different validation 
processes. While in blockchain all nodes mine on the same block and only one block is appended to the blockchain, in blockDAGs nodes mine different 
blocks in parallel, which are added. Thus, blockDAGs are considered more energy efficient than blockchains [144]. Although blockchain is a special type 
of blockDAG, we decided to separate blockchain from blockDAG on the DLT concept level as the concepts differ in the targeted data structure and block-
storage organization [22,109,144,162].  
Figure 2: The level of decentralization is formed by the number of independent controllers (e.g., an 
organization or individuum) and the organization of nodes in the distributed ledger. An increased number 
of independent controllers who control validating nodes increases the overall level of decentralization of a 
distributed ledger 
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In Bitcoin, the first Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mechanism was presented, which could be applied in 
a large scale, the PoW-based Nakamoto Consensus [109]. Nevertheless, Nakamoto Consensus comes with 
several drawbacks such as poor throughput, exhaustive energy consumption, and vulnerability to attacks on 
integrity (see chapter 2.4.1). To overcome these drawbacks of the Nakamoto Consensus, numerous 
alternative consensus mechanisms have been developed and already applied to DLT designs such as GoChain 
[56], Hyperledger Fabric [4], and Tendermint [2]. The relevant consensus mechanisms for this work are 
summarized in Table 2. Due to the fact that the explanation of the mentioned consensus mechanisms is not 
in the scope of this work, we invite the reader to refer to the provided references to obtain detailed information 
on the technical details. 
2.2 Smart Contracts 
Several distributed ledgers offer the possibility to deploy and execute customized business logics through so-
called smart contracts. Smart contracts are software programs, which are developed in either basic OP_CODE 
(e.g., in Bitcoin Script language) [32,66] or even in high level programming languages (e.g., Java, Python, 
Solidity), which allow for Turing completeness [22,43,67]. When Bitcoin was invented, the development of 
smart contracts was limited to the use of cryptographic functions such as hashlocks, timelocks, and multi-
signatures. These functions can be used to formalize conditions to unlock and access stored assets (e.g., [62]). 
To give more flexibility to developers to implement more expressive smart contracts, the Ethereum 
foundation developed the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) that allows for the execution of Turing complete 
smart contracts, which can be developed in the high level language Solidity [22]. A smart contract in 
Ethereum is contained in a transaction, which is sent to and eventually stored on the Ethereum blockchain. 
A unique address is generated for the smart contract, which represents an account, which is managed by the 
smart contract. The smart contract can be called via this unique address to trigger targeted methods [22]. 
Ethereum smart contracts can store assets and issue transactions, if formalized conditions are met. Such 
conditions can even include data, which is not stored on the Ethereum blockchain (on-chain) because 
Ethereum smart contracts can retrieve data from external data sources (off-chain), so-called oracles [166]. If 
a smart contract is executed each node of the distributed ledger processes the smart contract individually 
similar to a regularly sent transaction by a user.  
Table 1: Exemplary classification of DLT designs according to the used 
terminology and the respective focus 
 public private 
permissioned GoChain [56] 
High performance general purpose 
Quorum [76] 
Financial asset transfers 
unpermissioned Ethereum [22] 
General purpose 
ARK Ecosystem [8] 
Flexibility for developers 
 
Table 2: Selection of relevant consensus mechanisms for this work 
Consensus Mechanism Identifier DLT Concept Finality Exemplary DLT Designs 
Delegated Proof of Stake DPoS Blockchain Total EOS [43] 
GHOST PoW Blockchain Probabilistic Ethereum [22] 
Nakamoto Consensus PoW Blockchain Probabilistic Bitcoin [109] 
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance PBFT Blockchain Total Hyperledger Fabric [4] 
Proof of Authority PoA Blockchain Total Ethereum [16] 
Proof of Elapsed Time PoET Blockchain Probabilistic Hyperledger Sawtooth [104] 
Proof of Reputation PoR Blockchain Total GoChain [55] 
Proof of Stake PoS Blockchain Probabilistic Dash [41] 
Tangle Tangle TDAG Probabilistic IOTA [127] 
Tendermint Tendermint Blockchain Total Tendermint [2] 
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2.3 Prior Research on Drawbacks of DLT Designs 
Applications on DLT heavily depend on the choice of a DLT design. It is important to assess possible 
drawbacks stemming from the selected DLT design to achieve viability and increase maintainability of 
applications on DLT. As DLT combines insights from several disciplines of computer science (e.g., 
distributed systems and public key encryption) and game theory, DLT designs are complex and implications 
for applications on the respective DLT design are not trivial to derive. DLT designs come with unobvious 
and deeply interwoven dependencies between DLT characteristics. To evaluate the applicability of DLT and 
to pave the way for a common understanding of DLT much research has already been done. Extant research 
on DLT can be distinguished into four research streams: description, analysis, application, and guidance (see 
Table 3). 
The description research stream incorporates structured descriptions and classifications of DLT, for example, 
taxonomies and listings of DLT characteristics. In this research stream, characteristics of and differences 
between DLT designs are collected and consolidated into a structured overview (e.g., [52,160]). However, 
dependencies between identified DLT characteristics are seldom investigated and the causes for the ever-
increasing number of DLT designs remain unclear. Hence, the practical or technical use of the identified 
DLT characteristics is limited to the provision of a common understanding of selected DLT designs. 
Implications for application development remain unclear. 
In the second research stream, analysis, dependencies between selected DLT characteristics are measured 
and individual dependencies between DLT characteristics are reported. For example, research reports that 
high performance of a DLT design mostly comes at the cost of its level of security [53,54]. Current research 
explains this trade-off in blockchains by the fact that various attacks result from an increased stale block rate, 
which is influenced, among other things, by the (mis-) configuration of block size and block creation interval 
in public, unpermissioned DLT designs [53,54]. Stale blocks are mined blocks that are not used in the main 
branch of the blockchain, and thus remain only in forks. On the other hand, consistency is impeded due to 
long propagation delays [50]. However, the application perspective is not considered in prior research 
because most of the research articles do not explain practical implications resulting from the observed effects 
produced by reconfigurations of DLT characteristics. Thus, a holistic view on dependencies between DLT 
characteristics and resulting drawbacks is not presented in this research stream. 
The third research stream focuses on the application of DLT in certain domains, for example, supply chain 
management, health IT, or the Internet of Things. Due to the novelty of DLT, the potential for applications 
on DLT is still under investigation. Hence, several prototypes of applications on DLT were already developed 
and drawbacks due to the choice of the chosen DLT designs have been identified. For example, the Ethereum 
blockchain is considered to have a low throughput [68,173] and is costly [153] for the use in applications in 
the field of Internet of Things [68]. The Bitcoin blockchain cannot provide confidentiality and has an even 
lower throughput than Ethereum [79]. IOTA, which is predominantly designed for the use in the Internet of 
Things, is considered to be slow when it comes to the handling of a massive amount of data points [46]. 
HyperLedger Fabric [4] and Ripple [133] come with high throughput but limited horizontal scalability, which 
is why only a comparably small number of nodes is engaged in the transaction validation [60]. The practical 
drawbacks caused by DLT designs are often mentioned in the literature, but the causes of the respective 
drawbacks are not further investigated. 
The forth research stream, guidance, focuses on the development of processes to guide practitioners when 
looking for a suitable DLT design for applications. However, the presented processes are highly abstract and 
Table 3: Overview of prevalent DLT research streams 
Research Stream Description Example 
Description Incorporating structured descriptions and classifications of DLT designs [52,160] 
Analysis Measuring and reporting dependencies between particular DLT characteristics [53,54] 
Application Developing prototypes and investigating the application of DLT designs in certain domains [68,173] 
Guidance Developing processes to guide practitioners when looking for a suitable DLT design for 
applications 
[125,160] 
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focus on questions related to whether a distributed ledger is necessary or not. Some articles consider selected 
DLT designs and conduct a comparison between the selected DLT designs but hardly address causes for the 
viability of investigated DLT designs for applications. Other articles address the level of decentralization, 
which is strongly related to the number of independently maintained validating nodes, and openness, which 
considers if nodes can join the distributed ledger as validators with or without verification (e.g., [125,160]). 
However, the technical fundamentals of DLT that are crucial for the viability of a DLT design for an 
application are only sparsely discussed. Therefore, the existing measures to evaluate viability of an 
underlying architecture cannot be effectively used to assess drawbacks of applications on DLT resulting from 
DLT designs. 
The mentioned four research streams provide important contributions for the generation of a holistic view on 
drawbacks of applications on DLT caused by the configuration of DLT characteristics. Drawbacks resulting 
from trade-offs between DLT characteristics deter viability for use cases and applications on DLT. Several 
trade-offs have been identified in multiple research articles, which make it obvious that there will not be a 
single DLT design fulfilling requirements of all use cases [78]. However, the research streams are separated, 
and it is hard to obtain a holistic overview of the implications of a DLT design for an application on DLT. 
At the time of writing, the authors are only aware of one particular article that examines trade-offs in DLT 
[117]. However, the article is limited to the context of electronic health records and only considers 
blockchain. Therefore, the findings on dependencies between DLT characteristics should be synthesized to 
identify trade-offs and support development of applications on DLT without restriction to a particular field 
of application. Through the synthesis of the different research streams, the decision-making process when 
looking for an appropriate DLT design will be supported due to a holistic view on the origins for drawbacks 
of DLT designs. 
2.4 Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities 
To understand drawbacks and trade-offs it is important to provide a common understanding about potential 
attack vectors. Therefore, we briefly review prominent attacks on DLT designs and explain smart contract 
vulnerabilities, which deem relevant for this work. For quick reference, we have summarized the attack 
vectors for DLT designs and the vulnerabilities of smart contracts in the appendices A.1 and A.2. 
2.4.1 Attacks on DLT Designs 
Despite DLT is often considered to be immutable, there have already been successful attacks on distributed 
ledgers that rewrote the transaction history (e.g., [134]). In this section, we explain the most prominent attacks 
on the integrity of a DLT design, which play a role in the identified trade-offs. It should be noted that the 
explained attacks predominantly draw from forkable DLT designs (e.g., Bitcoin [109], Ethereum [22]). 
 
51 % Attack. A DLT design can be a victim of 51 % attacks if the applied consensus mechanism only provides 
probabilistic finality and relies on a majority decision among nodes. If the adversary controls the majority of 
nodes, she can rewrite the transaction history because the majority of nodes agrees on the fraudulent state of 
the distributed ledger. In DLT designs such as Bitcoin, where nodes can join and leave the network arbitrarily, 
mechanisms are engaged to prevent adversaries from setting up a huge number of virtual nodes to eventually 
reach the majority in the consensus finding. Such mechanisms usually employ PoW [74], where nodes must 
first do computational work before new data can be appended to the distributed ledger. 
 
Balance Attack. A balance attack can be defined as the process of transiently disrupting communications 
between subgroups of miners with equal mining power [111]. While the communication is disrupted, 
transactions can be submitted to one subgroup while mining new blocks in another subgroup. The attacker’s 
aim is to outweigh the blockchain branch she submitted transactions to with the blockchain branch she 
participates in the mining process. As a result, the ledger may be rewritten [111]. Balance attacks raise the 
probability for successful double spending in forkable blockchains [111]. 
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Blockchain Anomaly. The blockchain anomaly considers the impossibility for the blockchain to guarantee 
that a committed transaction is not abortable [110], which can finally enable double-spending. The 
blockchain anomaly describes the phenomenon that a transaction ti gets committed and, based on this 
observation, one issues a new transaction tj knowing that ti was successfully committed. Blockchains may 
finally discard ti and only commit tj, which violates the dependency between ti and tj. For example, Bob 
transfers a number of coins to Caroline (tj) given that Bob had successfully received coins from Alice (ti) 
before. However, once these nodes get notified of another branch of committed transactions, the fork 
resolution rule is applied, which eventually removes the committed transaction ti from the main branch. Later, 
the transaction tj is successfully committed to the main branch. Thus, the dependency between tj and ti is 
violated. Referring to the previous example, Bob has transferred an amount of money to Caroline (tj), 
although the pre-condition of the successful ti was not fulfilled as Bob did not receive money from Alice 
[110]. The blockchain anomaly affects mainstream blockchains whose consensus mechanism does not ensure 
deterministic agreement between nodes. 
 
Bribery Attack. During a bribery attack, an adversary incentivizes validating nodes to work on a particular 
branch of the DLT design, which the adversary rules [15]. Thus, the number of nodes, which work on the 
adversary’s branch, increases and may eventually catch up with the main branch of the blockchain and, 
finally, become the main branch. 
 
Double Spending. Double spending is the multiple use of a particular asset by the same user for different 
purposes without the asset being returned [109]. In a double spending attack, the adversary suggests to a user 
that a product was payed, while transferring the just issued coins back to one self’s wallet. After the fork was 
resolved, the adversary still owns her coins and the product she actually not payed for. 
 
Eclipse Attack. In an eclipse attack, adversaries target network partitioning by delaying or blocking message 
forwarding (e.g., transactions) to nodes of the attacked network partition [61]. Due to the delaying or blocking 
of messages, certain nodes are isolated from the network. Thus, the attacking nodes monopolize the message 
propagation of the isolated nodes to others. Such network partitioning facilitates double spending. For 
example, an attacking node would send a transaction (e.g., a payment) to the victim node. The victim node 
validates the transaction and is, subsequently, eclipsed from the network by the attacking node. Then, the 
attacker issues another transaction to the entire network and, thus, spends the same assets again. As long as 
the victim node is isolated from the network and only receives data from the malicious nodes, the fraudulent 
first payment remains valid on the victim node.  
 
Selfish-Mining. Selfish-mining attacks describe a phenomenon where a set of nodes mines their own branch 
of a blockchain without publishing their blocks to the main branch until their selfish-mined branch would be 
chosen as future main branch by the particular fork resolution rule [44,53,143]. A selfish mining attack is 
carried out by attackers to obtain excessive rewards or waste the computing power of honest miners [53]. It 
was found that a successful selfish-mining attack can already be performed in Bitcoin, if at least 1/3 of the 
miners is malicious [44]. 
 
Long-Range Attack. A long-range attack targets rewriting the transactions history from the genesis block (the 
first block in a blockchain). The new chain produced by the adversary can completely or only partially differ 
from the main chain. A long-range attack is successful as the adversary has generated a longer chain than the 
main chain, which is similar to selfish-mining [34]. However, only DLT designs, which rely on PoS as a 
consensus mechanism can be victim of long-range attacks because PoW-based DLT designs require too much 
computational effort to rewrite transaction history beginning from the genesis block, which is why Long-
Range Attacks are considered impractical for PoW-based DLT designs [34]. 
 
Sybil Attack. In a sibyl attack, the adversary sets up multiple (virtual) nodes to reach majority in a consensus 
mechanism to eventually rewrite the transaction history of the distributed ledger. To decrease the probability 
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of successful sibyl attacks, all nodes must perform a certain PoW, where each node must first finish a 
computationally hard task, which can easily be evaluated by other nodes (e.g., in Bitcoin guessing a nonce 
with a corresponding hash value, which at least starts with a defined number of zeroes) [74]. Sybil attacks 
can be performed to isolate (honest) nodes from the network by no relaying transactions of these nodes 
[40,119]. The selective relaying of transactions can contribute to double spending [112]. 
 
Routing Attacks. The previously described attacks that rely on majority decisions on the state of the 
distributed ledger can be successfully performed based in combination with routing attacks. In routing 
attacks, influence nodes or network operators to intentionally delay network messages are [7]. One such 
routing attack that has already been investigated in the context of DLT is called Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) hijack attack [7]. 
2.4.2 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities 
Smart contracts are of high interest in the field of DLT as they enable the development of complex 
applications on DLT. Nevertheless, smart contracts change several programming paradigms and, thus, come 
with certain issues such as error handling (e.g., rollbacks of failed transactions). Since Ethereum introduced 
Turing-complete smart contracts on public, unpermissioned DLT designs, the issue of how to prevent infinite 
loops became crucial to prevent system failure. Consequently, a pricing schedule was applied, which requires 
an economic equivalent (called gas) to be paid for the execution of a particular smart contract [22]. Therefore, 
as someone initiated the execution of a smart contract, she has to pay a certain amount of gas for it. As soon 
as the quantity of gas is no longer sufficient to execute a smart contract, its execution is cancelled. In this 
case, we speak of an out-of-gas condition. Out-of-gas conditions always demand for an appropriate error 
handling. Otherwise, the respective smart contracts is locked automatically and cannot be executed anymore 
[58]. In the chapter, we present an excerpt of smart contract vulnerabilities, which are relevant for this work. 
For quick reference, we have summarized the smart contact vulnerabilities in Appendix A.1. 
 
Overflow/Underflow Attacks. Numbers in smart contracts are usually stored in variables of the datatype 
unsigned integer (uint). However, there is a particularity if the stored values exceed the maximum uint value 
(2256) because the value will circle back to zero. In underflows, the value of a uint variable undergoes zero 
and circles to its maximum value (2256) [9,58]. Overflow and underflow attacks exploit this particularity for 
different purposes such as value manipulations of payouts. To prevent overflow/underflow attacks, 
developers must consider if the uint value could exceed 2256. 
 
Unbounded Loops. The most standard form of a gas-focused vulnerability is that of unbounded mass 
operations. Loops whose behavior is determined by user input could iterate too many times, exceeding the 
block gas limit, or becoming too economically expensive to perform. The code may not have predicted this 
possibility, thus failing to ensure that the contract can continue to operate as desired under these conditions. 
This will commonly lead to a Denial of Service for all transactions that must attempt to iterate the loop [58]. 
 
Reentrancy. The database characteristics atomicity and sequentially of transaction execution may suggest 
that non-recursive functions cannot be re-entered before it is committed to a database. However, fallback 
mechanisms may allow an attacker to re-enter the caller function, which can produce unexpected system 
behavior such as loops of invocations, which eventually run into out-of-gas conditions [9,168]. Reentrancy 
can occur as a single smart contract invokes itself or in a chained execution of smart contracts. In one of the 
most prominent incidents in the context of smart contracts, the attack on the Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization (DAO) [168], reentrancy was exploited, which caused the hard fork of Ethereum into Ethereum 
classic and Ethereum in 2016. 
 
Wallet Griefing. A smart contract can cause unexpected errors when invoking external functionality that may 
itself throw an out-of-gas exception [154]. In the widespread Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), for example, 
transactions are issued to an account using the <recipientAccount>.send(uint) function. Using this function 
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to send assets can lock the smart contract if error handling is not properly implemented because the execution 
of <recipientAccount>.send(uint) can produce out-of-gas conditions [154]. Wallet griefing is also realistic 
when the smart contract should handle multiple clients without isolation and in standard practices to abort 
transactions as a failure in <recipientAccount>.send(uint) occurs [58]. 
3 Methodology 
To answer the RQ, we applied a three-step research approach. First, we conducted a literature review to 
extract DLT characteristics, where articles of all prior mentioned research streams of DLT were included. 
Our descriptive literature review [122] was guided by extant recommendations for literature reviews [19,81]. 
Second, we analyzed the identified DLT characteristics in detail to identify trade-offs in DLT designs. 
Finally, we consolidated the identified trade-offs into archetypes and derived implications for and drawbacks 
of applications on DLT. 
3.1 Literature Review 
To identify publications addressing DLT characteristics, we searched scientific databases that we deemed 
representative for the identification of DLT characteristics and related dependencies as they cover the top 
computer science conferences and journals: ACM Digital Library, EBSCOhost, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest, and 
ScienceDirect. To cover a broad set of publications, we searched each database with the following string in 
title, abstracts, and keywords: (blockchain* OR (distributed AND ledger*)). We limited our search to peer-
reviewed articles to ensure a high quality of articles. We identified 1,144 articles in this initial search as of 
June 2018. To identify and filter articles, we first checked the relevance of each article by analyzing title, 
abstract, and keywords. If any indication for relevance appeared, the article was marked for further analysis. 
We excluded articles that were duplicates (62), grey literature (i.e., editorials, unfinished manuscripts, 
dissertations) and books (18), not applicable to our study (56) or not available in English (31). This first 
relevancy assessment resulted in a sample of 977 articles deemed to be potentially relevant. Afterwards, a 
fine-grained relevance validation was made by reading the articles in detail, resulting in a final sample of 191 
relevant articles. In this second relevance assessment, we excluded articles that did not relate to viability of 
DLT characteristics for applications on DLT (710) or non-research articles (76). 
3.2 Data Analysis 
As a first step, we carefully read and analyzed 191 articles to identify the DLT characteristics, in particular 
we applied the coding rules proposed by Lacity et al. [87]. We recorded for each extracted DLT characteristic 
a name, a description, and the original source [87]. In total, 277 DLT characteristics were extracted. A list of 
so-called master variables was created to aggregate the identified DLT characteristics [87]. A master variable 
is an aggregation of similar DLT characteristics consisting of a master variable name and a master variable 
description [87]. If an identified DLT characteristic fitted into an existing master variable, we assigned it 
accordingly; otherwise, a new master variable was created. Since different people often put the same labels 
on different things and vice versa, it is crucial for the validity of a qualitative analysis to avoid semantic 
ambiguities. Shaw and Gaines [141] mention four possible semantic constellations: consensus (the same 
terminology is used for same concepts), correspondence (different terminology for same concepts), conflict 
(same terminology for different concepts), and contrast (different terminology for different concepts), for 
which we attributed in our analysis. For example, we aggregated the DLT characteristics immutability and 
tamper-resistance to the master variable integrity. We finalized the list of master variables by reviewing all 
assignments.  
To ensure that we identified a reliable set of master variables, we followed researchers stressing that an 
important goal is to reach theoretical saturation [29,51] regarding the emerging DLT characteristics, that is, 
the point when no new findings are gained in further articles. Lincoln and Guba [95:235] speak of the term 
‘point of redundancy’ in this context. Since no new master variable emerged in the last 27 articles identified 
in our literature review, we are confident to have reached saturation. To ease understanding, we use the term 
DLT characteristics for the identified master variables in the following as they represent an aggregation of 
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similar DLT characteristics. We applied an inductive approach grouping DLT characteristics into DLT 
properties under consideration of their particular objectives and application contexts. For instance, DLT 
characteristics were grouped into the DLT property security if they were related to common security topics 
such as availability and confidentiality. 
As a third step, we extracted dependencies between DLT characteristics, which have been described in the 
examined research articles (e.g., [52]) or in extent research on distributed systems (e.g., [18,45]). In parallel, 
we already coded trade-offs between DLT characteristics, which are explained in the particular articles (e.g., 
[54,78,117]). Subsequently, we synthesized the identified dependencies between DLT characteristics (e.g., 
more replications of the stored data increase availability) and derived trade-offs between DLT characteristics 
based on the identified dependencies between DLT characteristics (e.g., more replications increase the 
latency until consistency among all nodes is reached). Based on the extracted DLT characteristics, drawbacks 
for applications on DLT that are caused by the underlying DLT design were derived under consideration of 
common quality criteria in the field of software quality assessment [72]. Then, we consolidated the identified 
DLT properties and dependencies between DLT characteristics into one DLT archetype per DLT property 
ending up with seven DLT archetypes. Based on the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics and 
the generated archetypes, we derived drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the choice of the 
employed DLT design. The derived drawbacks are consolidated by existing applications on DLT and the 
respectively underlying DLT designs. 
4 Results 
4.1 DLT Characteristics 
The analysis of the relevant articles revealed 49 DLT characteristics that are relevant for the assessment of a 
DLT design’s viability for an application on DLT. As this articles focusses on trade-offs, the 49 DLT 
characteristics are briefly presented and defined in Table 5 and Table 6. The inductive grouping of the 
identified 49 DLT characteristics resulted in a final set of 7 DLT properties, which are presented in Table 4. 
 
 Table 4: Identified DLT properties  
DLT Property Description 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Community A group of individuals who have a common interest in using and/or maintaining a DLT design 6 
Flexibility The degree of technical freedom to customize a DLT design and to deploy applications on a DLT 
design 
231 
Law & 
Regulation 
The ability of authorities to enforce compliance of a DLT design with legal and regulatory 
requirements 
92 
Transparency The perception of an individual of being informed about the relevant actions and characteristics of 
another party who uses the DLT design 
186 
Performance The accomplishment of a given task on a distrusted ledger measured against targets for accuracy, 
completeness, cost, and speed 
509 
Security The preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored on a distributed ledger 1109 
Usability The extent to which DLT design users can achieve their goals with respect to effectiveness, 
efficiency, and satisfaction in their use contexts 
238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
Table 5: Identified DLT characteristics 
DLT 
Property 
DLT 
Characteristic 
Description 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
Development 
Activity 
The engagement and size of the community involved with the continued development of the 
DLT design. 
Developer Support Assistance (e.g., documentation, forums) offered by the community or foundation to answer 
questions with respect to deployment and operation of applications on the DLT design. 
Incentive 
Mechanisms 
The structures in place to motivate contribution of resources (e.g., computing power) for DLT 
design operation. 
Network Size The number of nodes participating in a DLT design. 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 
Interoperability The ability to communicate between DLT designs and with other external services from a DLT 
design. 
Maintainability The degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which a DLT design can be kept operational. 
Modularity The logical partitioning of a DLT design into smaller components to facilitate implementation, 
updates, and change management, among others. 
Smart Contract 
Support 
The degree to which the DLT design supports the integration, development, and testing of smart 
contracts. 
Token Purposes The possible uses of tokens within a DLT design (e.g., security token, utility token, stable coin). 
Transaction Size 
Limit 
The existence and measure of a fixed maximum storage size of a transaction. 
L
aw
 &
 R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Auditability The degree to which an independent third party (e.g., state institution, certification authority) 
can assess the technical functionality and stored data of a DLT design. 
Censorship 
Resistance 
The probability that a transaction in a DLT design will be intentionally aborted or processed 
with malicious modifications. 
Compliance The alignment of DLT design characteristics and operation with regulatory requirements. 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
The existence of control mechanisms (e.g., decision rights and accountabilities) to ensure 
desirable behavior of DLT design users (e.g., customers, miners). 
Liability The existence of a real or juridical person that can be subjected to litigation with respect to the 
DLT design. 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
Block Creation 
Interval 
The time between the creation of consecutive blocks (only in DLT designs using blocks). 
Block Size The size of data that can be stored in a block (only in DLT designs using blocks). 
Confirmation 
Latency 
The time until sufficient subsequent transactions have been added to a distributed ledger so that 
the likelihood of future transaction manipulation becomes negligible. 
History Retention The maximum number of transactions that can be maintained by a DLT design. 
Resource Efficiency The computational efforts required to operate a DLT design (e.g., transaction validation or block 
creation). 
Message 
Propagation 
Efficiency 
The time, bandwidth, and number of connections required to propagate transactions (or blocks) 
through the network. 
Propagation Delay The time between the submission of a transaction (or block) and its recipience by all nodes. 
Response Time The time between sending a transaction and receiving feedback from a DLT design. 
Scalability The capability of a DLT design to efficiently handle decreasing or increasing amounts of 
required resources (e.g., of transactions per second). 
Throughput The maximum number of transactions that can be appended to a DLT design in a given time 
interval. 
Transaction 
Validation Latency 
The time required for verifying the validity of a transaction. 
T
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
 Traceability The extent to which transactions can be traced chronologically in a DLT design. 
Transaction Content 
Visibility 
The ability to publicly view a user account’s holdings and transactions in a DLT design. 
Unidentifiability The degree of difficulty of mapping an account to real identities in a DLT design. 
Node Verification The extent to which nodes are verified prior to joining a distributed ledger. 
14 
 
4.2 Trade-Offs between DLT Characteristics 
In the following, we present the 26 identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics. 
A. Flexibility vs. Performance 
A.1. Smart Contract Support vs. Required Bandwidth 
The use of oracles (off-chain data feeds) in smart contracts enables more flexibility in defining the conditions 
that must be fulfilled before the smart contract issues transactions. Each time a smart contract is triggered, 
every node executes the smart contract. If an oracle is requested from a smart contract, the oracle receives 
requests from every node. Thus, an oracle can become a performance bottleneck as the oracles’ bandwidth 
may be not enough for the number of almost simultaneous requests by nodes. 
A.2. Smart Contract Support vs. Transaction Validation Speed 
Support for more expressive programming languages (i.e., C++, Java, or Solidity) enables the development 
of smart contracts that offer a broad range of functionality. The more functionality is added to a smart 
contract, the higher becomes its runtime complexity. Ultimately, this impedes performance because of the 
increased execution time for smart contracts. Consequently, the time required for transaction validation 
increases [31]. Compilation of the smart contract code further influences execution time as can be seen, for 
Table 6: Identified DLT characteristics 
DLT 
Property 
DLT 
Characteristic 
Description 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Atomicity The assurance that transactions are either completely executed or not executed. 
Authentication The degree to which the correctness of particular data, which is stored on a distributed ledger, 
can be verified. 
Availability The probability that a distributed ledger is operating correctly at any point in time. 
Confidentiality The degree to which unauthorized access to data is prevented. 
Consistency The homogeneity of data stored by all nodes participating in a DLT design. 
Durability The property of a database that data, which was once committed to the ledger, will not be lost. 
Fault Tolerance The degree to which a DLT design continues to operate correctly even if transactions (or blocks) 
are dropped (or delayed) or if nodes fail. 
Integrity The degree to which transactions stored on the distributed ledger are protected against 
unauthorized (or unintended) modification or deletion. 
Isolation The property of a database that transactions do not impact each other during their execution. 
Level of 
Decentralization 
The number of independent node controllers participating in transaction validation and 
consensus finding. 
Node Trust Level The trustworthiness of nodes participating in a DLT design. 
Non-Repudiation The difficulty of denying participation in transactions. 
Reliability The period of time during which a distributed ledger is correctly functioning. 
Stale Block Rate The number of blocks in a period of time that have been mined but not appended to the 
distributed ledger (only in DLT designs using blocks). 
Strength of 
Encryption 
The difficulty of breaking cryptographic algorithms employed by the DLT design. 
U
sa
b
il
it
y
 
Cost Financial resources required for the implementation and operation of a DLT design. 
Ease of Node Setup The ease of configuring and adding a new or crashed node to the DLT design. 
Ease of Use The simplicity of accessing and working with a DLT design. 
Support for 
Constrained Devices 
The extent to which devices with limited computing capabilities (e.g., small sensors), can 
participate in a DLT design. 
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example, in C++, where developers can decide to apply static or dynamic linking for certain structures in the 
program code. 
B. Flexibility vs. Security 
B.1. Maintainability vs. Availability 
Maintainability of distributed ledgers is crucial to assure security and correct functioning. During 
maintenance, software updates are proposed for the distributed ledger, which should be performed on the 
clients on each node by the responsible node controller. To assure security and compatibility with other nodes 
of the same distributed ledger, each validating node should run the latest client software. Otherwise, hard 
forks can occur due to backward incompatibility of the applied protocol, which lead to permanent splits of 
the distributed ledgers [80,168]. Maintainability of distributed ledgers decreases as its number of separately 
controlled nodes increases, which in turn increases the distributed ledger’s level of decentralization (see 
Figure 2) [160]. When maintainability of a distributed ledger is decreased, development flexibility is 
deteriorated and, consequently, overall security of the distributed ledger could be decreased due to, for 
example, hard forks or missed fixes. In Bitcoin [109] and LiteCoin, for example, it has taken weeks to agree 
on updates such as the adoption of Segregated Witness (SegWit) and SegWit2x [115]. The execution of these 
updates on the majority of nodes took even longer. Nevertheless, especially public, unpermissioned DLT 
designs come with a level of redundancy beyond what is possible with traditional distributed databases. 
Therefore, especially public, unpermissioned DLT designs come with high availability and reliability. 
However, maintenance-related efforts increase due to the additional efforts when applying new client 
updates. The dependency between maintenance-related cost and the network size of the distributed ledger is 
also known as blockchain bloat or DLT bloat [129].  
B.2. Maintainability vs. Integrity 
Viable applications require efficient maintenance to allow adoption to changing requirements [84]. 
Applications on DLT share a DLT design as a digital infrastructure, which provides a high level of integrity. 
Integrity of a public, unpermissioned DLT design is increased as the level of decentralization increases. Thus, 
both dimensions of the level of decentralization (number of independent node controllers and number of 
validating nodes with equal permissions) influence a distributed ledger’s level of integrity [42,44]. 
Nevertheless, updates for the client protocol of the shared backend must be performed on each node 
individually, which is why maintenance of applications on DLT becomes hard as the distributed ledger 
provides a high level of decentralization. 
Integrity of a distributed ledger also impacts applications on DLT as once deployed smart contracts cannot 
be maintained like common program code [27]. Smart contracts must always be redeployed and initialized 
with the state of the obsolete version. Because the address of a smart contract must be updated for any module 
of the application that uses the smart contract, the stored smart contract addresses must be adapted in any 
frontends and chained smart contracts that reference the deprecated smart contract. As a consequence, less 
decentralized, public networks of distributed ledgers come with decreased integrity [42] but facilitate (smart 
contract) maintenance. 
B.3. Smart Contract Support vs. Confidentiality 
A trade-off exists between the use of complex smart contracts and confidentiality. This trade-off can even 
increase as smart contracts integrate external data feeds. In general, the execution of smart contracts on a 
distributed ledger is triggered through transactions, which are sent to the address of the smart contract. 
Transactions are stored on the underlying distributed ledger and are associated with the account of the 
transaction issuer. Thus, it is publicly transparent which account triggered a smart contract [82]. The byte 
code of smart contracts is also visible to the public. Smart contracts can be decompiled to retrieve the human 
readable source code. Thus, the history of issued transactions to a smart contract can reveal the current state 
of the smart contract. Even values of variables, which are declared private, can be assumed due to the 
transparent smart contract code and transaction contents [82]. Hence, the conventional use of smart contracts 
does not support confidentiality. Nevertheless, there are approaches for private smart contracts as, for 
example, proposed in the HAWK framework [82]. In HAWK, smart contracts are divided into a private and 
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a public part. The private part determines the payout distribution among parties, which trigger the smart 
contract, where the input data (e.g., a number of coins) is kept private and is protected using zero knowledge 
proofs [82]. Thus, no other party, who triggers the smart contract, knows the input data other parties sent to 
the smart contract2. Similar issues concerning confidentiality, which result when using a third party, can be 
found in the off-chain interoperability of DLT designs with oracles. There are currently two predominant 
options to retrieve data from oracles: via HTTP or InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). HTTP requests cannot 
be directly made from a smart contract (e.g., in Ethereum). Therefore, relays are used to retrieve data from 
oracles. Relays are predominantly centralized instances that forward certain data, for example, in Provable 
and Oraclize [118] or TownCrier [166]. For the use of IPFS, interfaces have been integrated into several DLT 
designs (e.g., Ethereum). The use of HTTP and IPFS in DLT require a trusted party, which stores the 
requested data. Thus, the oracle provider can have insights into data flows that are made by users who trigger 
a smart contract. Although requests may be (partially) executed in a protected SGX enclave (e.g., in TowCrier 
[166]), there is at least the risk of a leaked key that can be used to decrypt the respective data. 
C. Law & Regulation vs. Anonymity 
C.1. Auditability vs. Transaction Content Visibility 
Assets in DLT are referenced in different types of tokens (i.e., equity, utility, or security tokens) [107], where 
equity tokens are predominantly used in cryptocurrencies. In distributed ledgers using equity or security 
tokens, it is crucial to be able to determine the current assets (e.g., number of coins) in the system to discern 
their value. Strong encryption of transactions, which are used to keep the user owned assets private, enables 
a low level of transparency but impedes auditability. Hence, the total number of equity tokens becomes hard 
to determine. 
D. Law & Regulation vs. Security 
D.1. Governance vs. Integrity 
Especially after the incident of the DAO in 2016 [168], a controversial discussion evolved within the 
blockchain communities whether results of security breaches should be reversable or not [65,152]. Resetting 
a ledger’s transaction history in a public, unpermissioned distributed ledger (e.g., Ethereum) requires a 
process where node controllers need to vote for or against a hard fork and, subsequently, miners should 
update client code according to the voting results (e.g., [172]). During the process of a hard fork, the number 
of miners that participate in the original chain decreases, while the number of miners on the new chain 
increases. In DLT designs that reach consensus based on shares of computational power (e.g., hashing 
power), the total shares of the original network decrease while the total share in the new branch of the 
distributed ledger increases. Due to the rapid changes in the shares, especially distributed ledgers that base 
on PoW become more vulnerable to attacks on integrity (see chapter 2.4.1), if no protective measures have 
been applied beforehand. 
D.2. Governance vs. Level of Decentralization 
In contrast to traditional governance models where decision rights are organized hierarchically, DLT changes 
the governance (e.g., the agreement on policy or protocol updates), due to its distributed nature [14]. In public, 
unpermissioned DLT designs, disagreement on to-be-appended data is represented as forks that are resolved 
in accordance with the applied consensus mechanism [14]. Public, unpermissioned DLT designs inhibit the 
use of traditional governance with strict roles and permissions that are used for decision making on policy 
updates. By applying permissions to the DLT design, a hierarchy between nodes is created (e.g., validating 
nodes and storage-only nodes). Thus, the level of decentralization (see Figure 2) decreases, and traditional, 
centralized governance becomes better applicable to the DLT design [160]. 
E. Performance vs. Performance 
                                                          
2 The public portion of a HAWK smart contract is composed of three parts: publicly executed code, privately executed code, HAWK manager code. While 
the publicly executed code is executed on each node of the distributed ledger, the privately executed portion of the smart contract code is only executed by 
users, who sent transactions to the smart contract. The HAWK manager is a trusted party, who runs the HAWK manager code in an Intel SGX enclave [3]. 
Thus, the HAWK manager must be trusted to not disclose private data of a smart contract, which is sent for the execution of the smart contract. 
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E.1. Block Creation Interval vs. Stale Block Rate 
As the block creation interval becomes smaller in forkable DLT designs, the transactions can be faster 
committed to the distributed ledger. However, after a new block has been mined, other nodes are not 
immediately aware of the newly mined block and keep on mining an already deprecated block. Ideally, each 
node stops mining an already mined block immediately to save computational resources. However, each node 
must first receive the new block, before it stops mining on it. Due to propagation latency, nodes might receive 
the new mined blocks late. During that period, the node mines on a stale block. Therefore, the stale block 
rate heavily depends on the block interval and the block sizes [49]. Thus, smaller block creation intervals 
increase the probability of stale blocks [49], the stale block rate, and cause computational inefficiency. 
F. Performance vs. Security 
F.1. Block Creation Interval vs. Level of Decentralization 
In public DLT designs, where mining is performed to obtain a certain reward, a long block creation interval 
decreases the frequency of reward payouts and decreased likelihood of rewards for individual miners. This 
contributes to high variance in received payments for miners. Hence, it is more likely that nodes will join 
mining pools to increase the probability to receive rewards from mining [36,151]. A mining pool is a union 
of miners, who share mining rewards if one of these nodes receives the mining reward. Thus, the probability 
to receive some coins increases for each node. Simultaneously, the formation of mining pools decreases the 
level of decentralization of a distributed ledger [151]. 
F.2. Throughput vs. Consistency 
An increased block size comes with a longer block propagation delay [50,54,160] resulting in a longer state 
of inconsistency between nodes in a distributed ledger [33,153]. For Bitcoin and Ethereum it was found that 
the percentage of separately mined blocks, which are successfully committed to the blockchain’s main chain, 
becomes low as the block size and the block propagation delay increase [54], which is why the stale block 
rate increases. Due to the increased stale block rate, inconsistent views on the ledger are provided by multiple 
nodes until the forks are resolved. Such inconsistent states, in turn, support successful attacks (see chapter 
2.4.1). Thus, forkable DLT designs based on PoW can only improve the transaction throughput by degrading 
consistency (and increasing vulnerability) [13]. 
F.3. Throughput vs. Fault Tolerance 
In blockchains, the requirement for high throughput is predominantly met by applying finality-preserving 
consensus mechanisms where a small set of nodes participates in the transaction and block validation process 
such as PBFT [24]. In such consensus mechanisms, the number of nodes n determines the message 
complexity for the synchronization of the nodes’ states in O(n2) (for DPoS and PBFT). Thus, finality comes 
at the cost of the level of decentralization of the distributed ledger and its fault tolerance. For example, 
cryptocurrencies thrive in a highly adversarial environment and, thus, demand for a high level of fault 
tolerance, which is closely related to a high level of decentralization. A high level of decentralization requires 
a large number of diverse participants in a distributed ledger to increase availability, resilience, and integrity 
[105]. In the case of cryptocurrencies, fault tolerance is prioritized above all other DLT properties such as 
performance and flexibility. For example, the Bitcoin blockchain achieves throughput of only 10 transactions 
per second and a transaction takes on average of 10 min to be committed [109]. Nevertheless, Bitcoin is fault 
tolerant to up to 50 % of faulty miners [109]. In contrast, PBFT achieves high throughput of thousands of 
transactions per second but tolerates only f =
|R|−1
3
 faulty nodes f in a set R of validating nodes in the 
distributed ledger [24]. 
F.4. Throughput vs. Integrity 
For the DLT concept blockchain it was found that an increased block size can increase throughput because 
more transactions can be conveyed per block [54]. In distributed ledgers using blocks, block propagation 
delays are strongly influenced by block size [33,160,162] and bandwidth [128]. Thus, the increased 
throughput comes with longer block propagation delays that result in a higher probability of forks [160]. The 
resulting forks increase the probability of successful attacks on the integrity of the distributed ledger [65], 
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which enable to (partially) rewrite the history of stored transactions (see chapter 2.4.1). It has been shown 
for blockchains that a longer block creation interval increases resilience of a DLT design towards forks and 
resulting attacks such as selfish-mining [48,49], long-range attacks [34], bribery attacks [15], or other attacks 
that base on forks (e.g., 51 % attack) [34]. 
Furthermore, highly varying loads on the distributed ledger caused by variations on transaction frequency 
result in block size variations, which cause variations in the block propagation delay in the network [71]. 
Variations in the block propagation delay increase the probability of successful selfish-mining attacks thereby 
threatening security [44,53]. Thus, the likelihood that a set of malicious nodes, which perform selfish-mining, 
can revert the transaction history increases. Consequently, the increased block size increases vulnerability 
towards attacks on the integrity of data stored on a distributed ledger. 
F.5. Throughput vs. Level of Decentralization 
One major technological drawback inherent to current public blockchains pertains to the issue of throughput. 
This means that current public blockchains, for instance, Bitcoin or Ethereum, are unable to handle 
transactions in the thousands per second [73]. Nevertheless, public DLT designs come with the requirement 
to include thousands of nodes into the distributed ledger. Therefore, the applied consensus algorithms such 
as PoW or PoS are predominantly designed to reach consensus across multiple nodes with a comparably high 
(Byzantine) fault tolerance. Each node is included into consensus finding, which is why consensus 
mechanisms for highly decentralized distributed ledgers only provide probabilistic finality [146]. In contrast, 
faster consensus mechanisms can be applied using, for example, PBFT [24] or PoA [5]. Such consensus 
mechanisms provide finality in consensus finding but can only include a comparatively small set of validating 
nodes due to exhaustive communication effort [106,145,146]. Commonly, consensus mechanisms providing 
finality are applied in permissioned DLT designs where only a selected subset of nodes participates in 
consensus finding and other nodes merely store replications of the distributed ledger. In current consensus 
mechanisms for public DLT designs, the level of decentralization decreases to achieve an increase in 
throughput, for example, GoChain’s PoR, which builds upon PoA and allows only selected organizations to 
run a validating node [55]. Hence, increased throughput often comes at the cost of the level of 
decentralization. Nevertheless, there are consensus mechanisms that apply special derivates of PBFT to 
public, unpermissioned DLT design (e.g., Tendermint [2], EOS [43]), where a set of nodes is randomly 
chosen to reach consensus based on the particular stake of particular nodes. However, this still centralizes 
decision making to a subset of nodes. 
G. Security vs. Security 
G.1. Confidentiality vs. Integrity 
To preserve confidentiality, DLT designs are often implemented in a closed, private network, where only 
particular nodes can join (private, unpermissioned DLT designs), for example, the private Ethereum 
blockchain or HyperLedger Fabric. However, a small number of known nodes makes it easier to have detailed 
information on the network topology. Access to a detailed network topology facilitates initiation of targeted 
delays in the communication between nodes because the data flow is known [111]. Thus, the probability for 
successful balance attacks [111] increases in forkable DLT designs such as Ethereum, which violates a 
distributed ledger’s immutability. Increased vulnerability for immutability violations reduces the integrity of 
a distributed ledger. 
G.2. Consistency vs. Availability 
Distributed systems theory reveals a trade-off between consistency and availability—the CAP Theorem 
[1,50]. This trade-off also persists in the field of DLT and is caused by latency in block propagation, for 
example, due to big block sizes or network failures. The larger the number of nodes that must receive new 
transactions, the longer the distributed ledger is in an inconsistent state. The larger the number of nodes of a 
distributed ledger, the more time it takes until each node has received the new block. However, many 
replications of the data stored on the distributed ledger increases availability. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between high availability and fast consistency. 
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G.3. Level of Decentralization vs. Consensus Latency 
A high level of decentralization implies a large network of individually maintained nodes. In turn, the number 
of nodes which participate in the consensus mechanism strongly affects the consensus latency [106,160]. 
Consensus finding between validating nodes is hard to achieve, especially, under consideration of Byzantine 
failures. In public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers participation of a high number of independent nodes 
in the consensus finding is required to prevent the distributed ledger from Byzantine failures. If strict timeouts 
would be applied, the distributed ledger would become more vulnerable to routing attacks that cause network 
partitions due to, for example, BGP hijack attacks [7]. However, a high level of decentralization increases 
the consensus latency dramatically because agreement (e.g., all nodes choose the same block) and termination 
(e.g., all nodes eventually choose a block) in consensus finding cannot be reached at the same time in 
asynchronous systems. Thus, consistency and synchronicity must be relaxed in public, unpermissioned DLT 
designs to achieve liveliness in a distributed ledger with a high level of decentralization.  
G.4. Level of Decentralization vs. Integrity 
As the network size increases (in public, unpermissioned DLT designs) due to additional nodes, which are 
individually controlled, it becomes unlikely that participating node controllers have the same intentions or 
even know each other (in the real world). Hence, the level of decentralization increases on both the controller 
side and architectural side as the number of separate nodes increases (see Figure 2). The presence of a 
consortium or majority of the same interest that takes control of the distributed ledger with a majority of at 
least 51 % of the overall hashing power becomes unlikely, which strengthens the integrity of the respective 
DLT design. Nevertheless, consensus mechanisms in large public, unpermissioned DLT designs 
predominantly engage probabilistic finality to increase responsiveness (e.g., PoW, PoS). In contrast, private, 
unpermissioned DLT designs incorporate a small number of identifiable (trusted) nodes. Hence, the level of 
decentralization decreases on the controller side. Due to the usually small number of nodes in a private DLT 
design, the overall level of decentralization of the distributed ledger decreases. Given that a consensus 
mechanism is applied that assures probabilistic finality, the likelihood of successful tampering with the data 
stored in a distributed ledger increases. Each node of a private DLT design has increased influence in the 
distributed ledger which increases vulnerability towards, for example, the blockchain anomaly [110]. Thin 
nodes, which only store parts of the distributed ledger, must assume that miners verify all blocks and follow 
an incentive mechanism when mining. Otherwise thin nodes risk to accept invalid transactions [150]. End-
users who only retrieve data from the distributed ledger and do not maintain an own mechanism to verify the 
distributed ledger’s integrity cannot be sure that the distributed ledger’s transaction history has not been 
tampered with [42]. In permissioned DLT designs where only a subset of nodes is permitted to validate 
transactions and issue new blocks the level of decentralization of a distributed ledger decreases although the 
number of total nodes of the distributed ledger might be bigger than in private networks. However, 
permissioned networks (and small private, unpermissioned networks) can make use of consensus 
mechanisms that preserve total finality (e.g., PBFT). After total finality has been reached among the 
validating nodes, committed transactions cannot be changed retroactively. Thus, the trade-off between level 
of decentralization and integrity predominantly refers to DLT designs that make use of only probabilistic 
finality. 
H. Security vs. Usability 
H.1. Level of Decentralization vs. Cost 
In public, unpermissioned DLT designs, which apply probabilistic finality, the level of decentralization is 
important to assure integrity of the stored data. Thus, arbitrary nodes are permitted to join the distributed 
network and to participate in the mining process. This leads to an eventually increasing number of nodes in 
the distributed ledger, which must all validate the issued transactions. Furthermore, in public, unpermissioned 
DLT designs PoW is often applied to prevent sibling attacks and resulting denial of service, for example, in 
Bitcoin [109], Ethereum [22], and IOTA [127]. Therefore, the total computational effort for the distributed 
ledger increases while transaction rate is assumed constant. To regulate the computational effort, public, 
unpermissioned DLT designs apply an economic incentive mechanism which rewards nodes for their share 
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of resources [160]. The economic rewards result in a pricing structure which is linked to the computational 
efforts. The pricing structure expects transaction issuers to pay a certain amount of assets (e.g., coins) for the 
transaction processing. In contrast, PBFT is unsuitable for many validating nodes and, thus, for a high level 
of decentralization as it requires each node to agree on a certain state to reach total finality. However, PBFT 
is less costly than PoW due to less required computational resources [106]. There is no mining in PBFT, 
which is why DLT designs that make use of PBFT come without the necessity of an extrinsic incentive 
mechanism (e.g., mining rewards) and there is no need to pay transaction fees. 
High availability is reached by a high number of replications of the ledger on separated nodes, which relates 
to the level of decentralization as the number of nodes should be physically distributed to decrease the 
likelihood of system failure. Reducing cost by reducing the number of nodes results in a reduction of the 
number of replications of the distributed ledger and weakens availability. A high number of replications is 
currently reached in public, unpermissioned blockchains because any node can join the distributed ledger. 
However, public blockchains also come with transaction fees in contrast to private or permissioned 
blockchains [113,132] resulting in higher overall cost for users. In public, unpermissioned DLT designs, 
transaction fees can constantly change, which makes it difficult to predict cost when using a public DLT 
design for applications [125]. In contrast, private DLT designs such as Hyperledger Fabric [4] lack 
transactions fees, which makes them cheaper to use. Cost become more predictable compared to public, 
unpermissioned DLT designs. However, private DLT designs usually come with less availability than public 
DLT designs. Additional cost emerges from interoperability between such private DLT designs and public 
DLT designs (e.g., to make payments), for example, if intermediaries such as notaries are employed to 
coordinate transactions between the respective distributed ledgers. 
H.2. Level of Encryption vs. Support for Constrained Devices 
The level of encryption of a DLT design results from the degree of security and performance of algorithms 
for the generation of public, private key pairs (e.g., to secure authentication), for content encryption (e.g., to 
increase confidentiality), and for hash value calculation (hashing). For public key encryption it is important 
that public, private key pairs are unique and cannot be guessed, while the algorithms time complexity is 
important for encrypting/signing of data and for decryption/verification. Several DLT designs encrypt 
transactions to increase confidentiality, for example, in Zcash [66] the zk-SNARK protocol is applied to 
encrypt and still validate transaction [165]. In addition to time complexity in public, key encryption, the 
applied hash algorithm implies a likelihood for collisions, that is, different inputs produce the same hash 
value as a respective outcome [11]. Low collision likelihood is desirable which is why a high level of 
encryption is targeted. An increased level of encryption requires more computational resources such as RAM 
and storage memory [100]. Thus, constrained devices such as microcontrollers can only hardly handle 
resource-intensive encryption [83,100]. 
H.3. Fault Tolerance vs. Response Time 
In distributed systems, Byzantine fault tolerant consensus mechanisms come with an inherent trade-off 
between robustness and responsiveness [105]. To cope with crashed nodes, weak synchronicity [39,105] is 
applied, where the system designer makes timing assumptions on network delays to guarantee that the system 
will respond within a defined timeframe. A node is assumed as failed, if the respective node did not respond 
within a specific timeframe, which is defined by the timing assumption [39]. In DLT designs such as Bitcoin 
and Ethereum [109], where the number of nodes is unknown, the timing assumption is expressed by the block 
creation interval [124], which prevents nodes from mining too long on stale blocks. Due to the weak 
synchronicity assumption in the respective consensus mechanism, the block creation interval strongly 
depends on the assumed block propagation time [123]. To minimize the number of forks and to retain 
security, the block creation interval must be set to a constant factor, which is large enough to minimize the 
stale block rate and small enough to reach enough throughput. If the block creation interval is set too short, 
fault tolerance decreases due to too many forks; however, new blocks are faster confirmed. On the other 
hand, if the block creation interval is set too long, confirmation latency enlarges because it takes more time 
to append a sufficient number of blocks to assume the respective block to be confirmed. In PBFT and 
consensus mechanisms that adopt PBFT [24] (e.g., DPoS), timing assumptions must be well balanced. If the 
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timing assumption is too short, too many nodes would be considered as failed, which weakens robustness of 
the underlying security model. If the timing assumption is too long responsiveness decreases and the change 
of the primary in the PBFT [24] may proceed too late. 
I. Transparency vs. Flexibility 
I.1. Unidentifiability vs. Maintainability 
Unidentifiability increases in a public and unpermissioned DLT design because nodes must not be verified 
before joining the distributed ledger. Eventually, it is even not known how many nodes actually maintain the 
distributed ledger. On the other hand, updates of DLT client code must be accepted by the majority of nodes 
in the whole network to keep compatibility after a hard fork and guarantee up-to-dateness [163]. It is hard to 
maintain the usually large number of nodes in public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers, which decreases 
maintainability [160]. In contrast, permissioned, private DLT designs, are better maintainable because each 
node must be verified and is verified before joining the distributed ledger. Since each participating node is 
known and the number of validating nodes in the distributed ledger is usually small, maintenance of the nodes 
is easier, which results in a higher level of flexibility. 
J. Transparency vs. Performance 
J.1. Unidentifiability vs. Throughput 
The less a network is controlled by a central authority and the more nodes participate in the network, the 
more obfuscated is the particular identity of nodes. Therefore, public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers 
promise increased unidentifiability than permissioned ones. In contrast, a smaller network with verified and 
identifiable nodes allows for higher throughput because faster consensus algorithms can be used (e.g., 
Byzantine Fault Tolerance). Moreover, unidentifiability can be improved by applying additional processes 
like mixing and the use of new keypairs for each transaction [170]. These processes create overhead due to 
preprocessing of each transaction, which results in decreased transaction validation speed.  
K. Transparency vs. Usability 
K.1. Node Verification vs. Ease of Node Setup 
Identification of nodes and verification of node permissions is required in permissioned DLT designs [160]. 
After permissions are granted to a node, the node can participate in voting-based consensus mechanisms, 
such as PBFT [24], PoA [5], or PoET [70]. Due to the need to verify nodes to check permissions, there is a 
need for a trusted certification authority in the public key infrastructure which issues certificates to respective 
nodes and verifies the nodes’ identities [64]. The need for a public key infrastructure produces additional 
efforts to obtain a certificate for the public, private key pair and the resulting dependency on a trusted 
certification authority. Due to the additional processes for the verification of a node identity, it becomes more 
complex to set up a node and to eventually participate in the distributed ledger. Thus, usability decreases. 
K.2. Unidentifiability vs. Support for Constrained Devices 
To achieve unidentifiability among users of a DLT design additional resources are required in terms of 
computational power, storage space, and computing time [92]. Due to the increased resource requirements, 
DLT designs that provide a high level of unidentifiability decrease support for constrained devices. For 
example, additional data structures can be used to increase unidentifiability but require additional storage 
size [79,92,128]. Another possibility to achieve unidentifiability is the application of additional processes 
such as mixing [97,170], which however also decrease the DLT design’s support for constrained devices. 
4.3 Drawbacks of DLT Designs for Applications on DLT 
Based on the previously presented trade-offs between DLT characteristics, Figure 3 illustrates the identified 
trade-offs on the DLT property layer. According to the identified trade-offs on the DLT property layer, we 
introduce six archetypes of DLT designs to illustrate and to consolidate the previously presented trade-offs. 
The archetypes indicate drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the choice of a DLT design, 
which is optimized towards a particular DLT property. As the community property features desirable DLT 
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characteristics for each archetype, we do not introduce a community archetype. The transparency archetype 
equals a system of as little as possible confidentiality, which is, for example, in Bitcoin exemplified (except 
of pseudonymity). Thus, we decided to introduce the opposite as an anonymity archetype, where implications 
deem more complex due to multiple additional processes and factors that must be considered 
 
Anonymity Archetype. To reach anonymity, additional processing of transactions is necessary (e.g., mixing, 
heavier encryption). These processes are time-consuming and require additional computational power, which 
slows down performance. A high level of decentralization supports anonymity, but increases consensus 
latency and, thus, consistency. From the governance perspective, auditability is deteriorated because 
transactions cannot be traced, and issuers and receivers of a transaction cannot be identified. The anonymity 
archetype does probably not offer the use of smart contracts because smart contracts pose a threat to 
confidentiality and ease the identification of transaction issuers. The anonymity archetype is predominantly 
found in public, unpermissioned ledgers, where multiple cryptographic techniques are applied (e.g., blind 
signatures, stealth addresses, zero knowledge proofs) to make it as hard as possible to assign transactions to 
their issuers or receivers or to reveal transaction contents. Popular representatives for the anonymity 
archetype are Dash [41], Monero [136], and Zcash [66]. In Dash, additional fees must be paid if a transaction 
should be issued privately, which decreases usability in terms of cost. Furthermore, Dash still allows to see 
the transaction recipient. In Monero, ring signatures are applied to obfuscate the identity of involved parties 
by data of their wallets [137]. However, Monero has been criticized for vulnerabilities that eventually allow 
to trace transactions [108]. Although Zcash does not obfuscate IP addresses of clients, it is currently 
considered the most confidentiality-preserving DLT design (especially when using it over the TOR-network). 
Applications with a strong requirement for anonymity should handle most of their advanced business logics 
off-chain because anonymity DLT designs probably provide only poor performance and development 
flexibility. Due to the immutability of stored data, there is a threat of revealing encrypted content as 
technology evolves. To reach anonymity using the proposed DLT designs, additional requirements should 
be met (e.g., the use of TOR browser [37] in Zcash) by the developers of an application on DLT. 
 
Flexibility Archetype. A high level of flexibility of a DLT designs can be achieved through a large support of 
smart contracts, a high degree of maintainability, and off-chain as well as cross-chain interoperability. Smart 
contract support in the flexibility archetype requires Turing completeness, which can be executed independent 
from the underlying operating system (e.g., by using a virtual machine). The more expressive supported 
programming languages for smart contract development are, the more software errors may be exhibited by smart 
contracts. Smart contract code is hard to review and to test, especially, with respect to chained execution (which 
come with cross-function race conditions) and error handling (e.g., out-of-gas errors) [9,35,58,156]. Hence, 
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Figure 3: Identified trade-offs between DLT properties 
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smart contracts can increase the risks for security breaches. Most common vulnerabilities in smart contracts can 
be exploited through re-entrance attacks (e.g., the DAO attack [168]) and underflow attacks. As smart contracts 
serve as a backend for applications on DLT, smart contracts should be maintainable with only small efforts. 
Due to the immutability of a DLT design, smart contract code itself cannot be modified post hoc. Thus, smart 
contract parts that require maintenance often should be deployed off-chain and called from the respective smart 
contract. However, the extensive integration of off-chain services deters anonymity and may form a bottleneck 
in the performance of the distributed ledger. Furthermore, a high degree of maintainability is supported by a 
small number of validating nodes, which is crucial to adopt engineering choices to evolving technologies and 
to assure security towards even new attacks (e.g., quantum resistance) [142]. Examples for DLT designs, which 
are oriented towards the flexibility archetype are Corda [20], EOS [43], HyperLedger Fabric [69], Tendermint 
[2], and Tezos [57]. All of these DLT designs require only a small portion of nodes to adopt policy updates. 
EOS and Tezos, as public DLT designs, apply governance mechanisms such as voting to democratize policy 
updates, which reveals a dependency between the level of decentralization and additional requirements for 
governance mechanisms to improve maintainability. Frameworks such as Qtum [130] that synthesizes the 
reliability of Bitcoin, Smart Contract capabilities of Ethereum can accelerate and facilitate the development of 
more secure smart contracts and can add new features (e.g., simple payment verifications [32]). Thus, the use 
of frameworks such as Qtum can increase flexibility, performance, security of applications on DLT. For 
example, Qtum aims at sociotechnical application suitability and offers the use of smart contract template 
libraries that have been developed following best practices to prevent security breaches of flawed smart 
contracts (e.g., [32,58,168]). 
Applications on DLT, which make heavy use of smart contracts in their business logics and, thus, require 
frequent updates on smart contracts, should be intensively tested, before deployed, to prevent severe threats 
such as out-of-gas conditions and wallet griefing [58] (see chapter 2.4.2). Alternatively, automated audits of 
deployed smart contracts can be conducted to identify possible threats for users [58]. Consequently, the 
development of such applications becomes costly and time consuming. Furthermore, maintenance efficiency 
must be considered because additional transaction cost may come up due to consensus finding on policy updates. 
 
Law & Regulations Archetype. Compliance with laws and regulations requires a high level of auditability and 
governance. Auditability requires visibility of transaction contents and linking of transaction to users, which 
requires a distributed ledger to be transparent. The level of compliance of any system always depends on current 
standards and regulations. Standards and regulations can be changed, and systems must adapt to changes to 
retain their level of compliance, which contradicts with the inherent DLT characteristic integrity. Due to the 
high level of integrity the retroactive adaptation of a distributed ledger to reach compliance becomes hard. For 
example, it is not possible to become compliant with the requirements imposed by the EU General Data 
Protection (GDPR) [28], if personal data was stored on a distributed ledger as GDPR demands for a possibility 
to delete personal user data completely. Therefore, a high level of compliance rules out a high degree of integrity 
and demands for efficient implementation of new policies. To be compliant with, for example, GDPR and to 
increase flexibility to adapt applications on DLT to future laws and regulations, developers must weigh which 
data should be stored on-chain or off-chain [6,28]. Then, off-chain data is administrated by a trusted third party 
or the user herself. When data should be retrieved from external data sources, off-chain interoperability and 
dependencies from external data providers must be considered. 
Nowadays, there are multiple DLT designs, which offer techniques for data auditing and governance. For 
example, in EOS the governance is maintained by establishing jurisdiction and choice of law along with other 
mutually accepted rules. This is usually done via the legally binding constitution. Every single transaction in 
EOS must include the hash of the constitution to the signature, which binds the users to the constitution. 
Compliance and DLT are highly discussed because it has not been clarified how to provide a decent level of 
flexibility to become compliant with future regulations and to make use of the high level of integrity of DLT at 
the same time (e.g., [28]). Hence, personal data is predominantly stored off-chain and is administrated by a 
trusted third party or on the users’ terminal devices using homomorphic encryption or zero-knowledge proofs 
to eventually protect data from malicious storage providers. Nevertheless, off-chain storage of data deters the 
level of decentralization of the particular application on DLT. Obviously, reliable interoperability of DLT 
designs with oracles becomes important for this archetype. Furthermore, the oracles themselves must also be 
compliant with the same laws and regulations. As a result, the efforts related to compliance can increase as DLT 
is used. 
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Performance Archetype. High performance requires the largest possible number of transactions per second and 
degree of scalability. To achieve that goal, a minimal message complexity of the employed consensus algorithm 
and encryption technique is necessary. Additionally, a smaller number of validating nodes speeds up system 
throughput while integrity is preserved due to finality. Yet, a smaller number of nodes decreases availability of 
a DLT and requires a higher level of trust towards validating nodes. This requires either verification of nodes 
and, hence, the loss of their anonymity or the adoption of hybrid consensus mechanisms such as Tendermint 
[2], which are also considered rather centralized. During the last decade, multiple DLT designs have been 
developed targeting high performance, for example, HyperLedger Fabric [69], IOTA [127], and GoChain [55]. 
Nevertheless, the named examples come with a small level of decentralization. HyperLedger Fabric makes use 
of a variant of PBFT, which is, per design, not scalable so that only a small number of validating nodes can be 
included [106]. The tangle of IOTA makes use of a so-called coordinator [127], which validates and appends 
new transactions, and decreases its level of decentralization. Another practical approach to increase 
performance, especially scalability, is sharding, where multiple distributed ledgers exist in parallel and are 
connected with each other (e.g., in Zilliqa [147], Wanchain [98]) [38,99]. Sharding requires interoperability 
between the DLT designs, which brings more complexity to the distributed ledger but also better maintainability 
of the particular distributed ledger. Applications, which require a high performance DLT design must come 
along with a limited level of decentralization or increased complexity due to sharding. New consensus 
mechanisms are in the making (e.g., 𝜀-differential agreement [139]), which scale proportional to the number of 
nodes in the network (e.g., seele [139]). These consensus mechanisms are promising but not tested yet. 
Applications that build upon the performance archetype are likely to be applicable in consortiums of 
organizations due to the low level of decentralization, where fault tolerance decreases. Additional contracts 
should be made to make organizations liable for malicious intents on the shared distributed ledger, due to the 
low level of decentralization. Furthermore, additional offers of this type of DLT design (e.g., light clients) 
should correspond to the capacity of the terminal devices (e.g., computing power, storage), which should be 
employed in the targeted system to eventually develop and operate viable applications on DLT. 
 
Usability Archetype. This type of DLT offers a maximum level of usability to users. The usability archetype is 
predominantly suitable for applications that need low response time, support for constrained devices, and low 
transaction cost. Furthermore, the management of a public, private key pair should be made easy and secure for 
the user, which is why the provision of secure tools for the organization of the users’ public and private keys is 
crucial. There is an inherent trade-off in distributed systems between robustness and responsiveness [45,105]. 
As the response time of the usability archetype should be short, robustness is decreased due to only eventual 
consistency. To make applications on DLT capable for constrained devices, a full replication of the ledger on 
each device should be avoided, for example, because of constrained storage size. Thus, the usability archetype 
should offer the technical foundation for the use of light nodes. However, light nodes do not contribute to 
increased availability or resilience of the distributed ledger because they do not store a full replication of the 
ledger. Public, unpermissioned DLT designs incentivize nodes to share resources with monetary mechanisms. 
Hence, the usability archetype comprises predominantly private DLT designs with no transaction fees. 
Applications that build upon the usability archetype DLT design must consider the digital key management. In 
contrast to centralized systems, which offer a “restore password” function, private keys cannot be recovered. In 
the case a user loses her private key, the respective assets cannot be accessed anymore. Thus, besides the DLT 
characteristics, the offer of secure wallets to store the digital key pairs is important to increase usability of a 
DLT design. Another option for digital key management is the integration of a trusted third party, which offers 
a fiduciary safekeeping. 
25 
 
 
Security Archetype. High security in DLT is supported by increasing network size due to more replications of 
the ledger, excluding possibly fraudulent nodes, and reducing flexibility for possibly flawed smart contracts. 
The DLT design should be highly available because there is no single point of failure, highly resilient towards 
attacks on the integrity of stored data, and be immune to developers’ failures (e.g., flawed smart contracts). 
Obviously, these goals contradict and cannot be reached at the same time. For instance, the unidentifiability of 
nodes is decreased to prevent attacks by fraudulent nodes. Thus, there is a trade-off within the security archetype 
that reveals two different security models: first, security by openness and, second, security by permissions. The 
first model, security by openness, achieves security in terms of high availability through the employment as 
much as possible nodes of equal permissions. This model sacrifices availability for integrity and confidentiality. 
Integrity is deterred because the high number of nodes of public, unpermissioned DLT designs cannot be 
synchronized by total finality-preserving consensus mechanisms but make use of consensus mechanism that 
only reach probabilistic finality. Furthermore, a sufficient level of decentralization must be guaranteed to deem 
integrity of such public, unpermissioned DLT designs given. This level of decentralization can only be provided 
Table 7: Overview of identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics for the 
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Auditability Transaction Content Visibility X  X    
Block Creation Interval Level of Decentralization    X X  
Stale Block Rate    X X  
Confidentiality Integrity     X  
Consistency  Availability     X  
Throughput    X X  
Fault Tolerance Response Time    X X  
Governance  Integrity   X    
Level of Decentralization X  X    
Level of Decentralization Consensus Latency    X X  
Cost     X X 
Integrity     X  
Level of Encryption Support for Constrained Devices     X X 
Maintainability Availability  X   X  
Integrity  X   X  
Node Verification Ease of Node Setup X     X 
Smart Contract Support  Confidentiality  X   X  
Required Bandwidth  X  X   
Transaction Validation Speed  X  X   
Throughput Consistency    X X  
Fault Tolerance    X X  
Integrity    X X  
Level of Decentralization    X X  
Unidentifiability Maintainability X X     
Support for Constrained Devices X     X 
Throughput X   X   
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by a very big number of nodes that participate in the mining process. Due to the high level of decentralization, 
confidentiality of stored data is decreased. The second security model, security by permissions, predominantly 
employs consensus mechanisms that reach finality, which is why integrity is more likely. Also, better 
confidentiality can be reached because data is only replicated across nodes that are verified. However, the level 
of decentralization decreases dramatically, which is why the particular participants have more impact in the 
consensus finding and may even drop particular transactions. There is the option to find consensus among 
verified nodes, while maintaining a replication of the ledger on multiple other nodes to increase availability. 
However, this hybrid approach decreases confidentiality and does not overcome the issues of increased 
influence of parties in the consensus mechanism. 
The most prominent DLT design that corresponds to the security archetype (security by openness) is the Bitcoin 
blockchain [109] because it is highly available and exposes only little potential for flawed smart contracts. 
However, Bitcoin does not fulfill all the security-related DLT characteristics (e.g., confidentiality). In contrast, 
Solidus [25] is predominantly designed as a private DLT design, which provides confidentiality among the 
participants of a consortium. 
Applications that require a high level of security must make a compromise due to the trade-offs within 
security. An application should be built upon a public, unpermissioned DLT design to achieve high 
availability, a high level of decentralization, and an open democratization of data to be appended. To preserve 
confidentiality the application should rather be built upon a private DLT design. However, the security 
archetype is probably hard to serve as an infrastructure for applications on DLT due to its low flexibility. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Principle Findings 
Our results indicate 26 trade-offs between the identified DLT characteristics (see Table 7) that come from 
dependencies between the 49 identified DLT characteristics (see Table 5, Table 6). The diversity of the 
identified DLT characteristics put emphasizes on the complexity of DLT itself and suggest the most prevalent 
aspects to be considered when comparing viability of DLT designs for applications on DLT. DLT pertains 
with databases and distributed systems, which is why we identified traditional characteristics of both 
domains, for example, the database characteristics atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability and fault 
tolerance as a characteristic of distributed systems. However, we identified multiple DLT-specific 
characteristics such as stale block rate, block size, and fault tolerance in terms of Byzantine failures [24,109]. 
Several of the identified trade-offs are inherent to distributed systems, for example, the CAP theorem [18,50] 
or the FLP impossibility [45], which explains the trade-off between safety and liveness in consensus 
mechanisms. However, the implications of these trade-offs on DLT designs differ from commonly used 
distributed databases, where a known number of nodes is employed, and consensus mechanisms are 
predominantly crash-fault tolerant (e.g., Paxos) but not Byzantine failure tolerant (e.g., Nakamoto 
consensus). 
Although implications on system behavior that result from reconfigurations DLT characteristics of 
blockDAGs and TDAGs is still not investigated to the knowledge of the authors, several trade-offs appear 
also applicable to these DLT concepts because they have been found applicable for distributed systems in 
general. For example, the CAP theorem [50], the FLP impossibility [45,105], and the trade-off throughput 
vs. level of decentralization (F.5).  
According to Figure 3 and Table 7, security is the DLT property which conflicts the most with all DLT 
properties including itself, for example, the trade-offs confidentiality vs. integrity (G.1) and consistency vs. 
availability (G.2). The importance of confidentiality for companies in particular can be observed in the real 
world during the integration of DLT into business processes. Several companies prefer private DLT designs 
to keep data confidential and, thus, sacrifice availability and fault tolerance (e.g., [89]). Therefore, a purely 
security oriented DLT design appears impossible to be developed. However, the trend of preferring private 
DLT designs over public DLT designs strongly requires universal interoperability with other DLT designs 
or external services to prevent being caught on a ‘blockchain island’ [21,75,94,96]. The second most 
conflicting DLT property is performance. The performance archetype has also an inherent trade-off between 
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performance-related DLT characteristics. However, this inherent trade-off block creation interval vs. stale 
block rate (E.1) merely pertains with the DLT concept blockchain. Consequently, the highly important DLT 
properties performance and security appear to exclude each other. This observation, however, cannot be 
confirmed in the presented archetypes as they do not exclude each other completely. For example, the 
flexibility archetype and the performance archetype rather support each other due to the targeted low level 
of decentralization. This dependency could also be found in prevalent DLT designs such as HyperLedger 
Fabric [4]. Drawing from Table 7, DLT may appear as predestined to follow laws & regulations and to 
provide a high degree of usability. However, in the examined literature, laws and regulations were mainly 
discussed in terms of compliance (e.g., [6,28,161]) and governance (e.g., [14,85,120]), and thus future 
research might reveal further dependencies and resulting trade-offs. The latter, usability for end-users, was 
predominantly focused on key management (e.g., [90]). Usability of applications on DLT such as wallets 
was still not considered to the knowledge of the authors. Referring to scientific literature on the use of 
applications on DLT (e.g., [10,47,59,159]) prevalent challenges in the widespread adoption of applications 
on DLT and in the emergence of an (at least basic) understanding of DLT for end-users to eventually raise 
awareness for the use of applications on DLT (e.g., the use of cryptographic keys). This impression may arise 
from the fact that current research is primarily concerned with the analysis of the security and performance 
of DLT designs. 
We also found that some of the identified DLT characteristics should be refined in more granularity to be 
applicable for suitability assessments of DLT designs for a particular application (e.g., cost, governance). For 
example, due to the newness of DLT and only few successful applications on DLT, the DLT characteristic 
cost is hard to operationalize. The reduction of cost to only transactions fees, energy consumption, and 
maintenance appears not sufficient [116,126]. Because companies generally target the reduction of 
transaction cost through the integration of new technology, a shift of transaction cost should be considered 
[126]. Nevertheless, the elimination of intermediaries to reduce transaction cost will probably result in new 
transaction cost and new intermediaries such as, for example, developers of specialized clients or the 
introduction of DLT patents [140]. Furthermore, as DLT disrupts collaboration among individuals and 
organizations, especially the organizational, social, and socio-economic impacts of DLT must be considered 
in costs [126]. For example, the use of DLT in the health sector can shift flexibility and responsibility of 
medical data maintenance towards patients. Patients can decide who can access their medical health records 
in what granularity (e.g., [10,30,135]). 
During the examination of white papers on recent DLT designs, such as GoChain [55,56], HyperLedger 
Fabric [4], or Tendermint [2], we recognized a shift from a pure decentralization through a high degree of 
openness (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) towards more centralization that seems largely motivated by 
improvements in performance due to the employment of faster consensus finding. Nevertheless, there is much 
criticism on this shift specifically because it contradicts with DLT’s original philosophy and sacrifices 
security for performance. Similarly, this shift aligns with our observation that most of the trade-offs between 
DLT characteristics are related to security or performance. As the corresponding archetypes even inhibit the 
simultaneous optimization of the DLT characteristics due to inherent trade-offs, interoperability between 
DLT designs (Cross-Chain Technology) turns out an important avenue for future research in the field of DLT 
to overcome prevalent issues in DLT (e.g., [98,148,157,159]). Research on Cross-Chain Technology is still 
in its infancy and is concerned with, for example, the transfer of assets from one distributed ledger to another, 
cross-chain oracles, or cross-chain asset encumbrance [21]. Cross-Chain Technology can increase flexibility 
of DLT designs and might help to mitigate the presented trade-offs through multi-chain networks, which are 
open for any DLT design. 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
The consolidation of the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics into archetypes elucidates that it 
is not possible to develop a one-size-fits-all DLT design that fulfills all requirements of all applications. Thus, 
it will be necessary to decide on a particular DLT design to develop viable applications on DLT. Our work 
supports the decision making for a DLT design under consideration of application requirements and DLT 
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characteristics. Drawing from the introduced DLT characteristics, a holistic view on DLT characteristics can 
be obtained when a DLT design is to be selected for an application on DLT. During application requirements 
engineering, requirements of applications towards a DLT design can be generated and mapped to the 
identified DLT characteristics. Thus, the generated overview of DLT characteristics supports practitioners to 
define requirements for DLT designs that must be considered to develop viable applications on DLT. The 
impact of these drawbacks on the planned application can be assessed beforehand using the presented 
archetypes which support the development of more viable applications on DLT. The archetypes support an 
initial assessment of possible drawbacks for a particular application coming from the underlying distributed 
ledger and give exemplary recommendations for DLT designs that are designed towards a particular 
archetype. For a detailed view of the causes for such drawbacks, the described trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics provide rationales. 
5.3 Implications for Research 
Our synthesis of the four previously disconnected research streams (description, analysis, application, and 
guidance) on DLT serves as a bridge between the different stakeholders in DLT and, thus, contributes to a 
holistic view of DLT. Based on the holistic view on DLT, the impact of design decisions for applications on 
DLT on the particular economic, regulatory, and technical environment can be investigated, which is 
necessary to foresee possible potentials and risks of DLT. The description research stream on DLT is 
consolidated in this work with a strong focus on applications on DLT. Thus, our classification of DLT 
characteristics can be used to generate a common understanding of important terms in the field of DLT and 
their technical dependencies across researchers from, for example, economics, computer science, and 
jurisprudence. Drawing from the identified DLT characteristics, computer scientists are incentivized to 
conduct thorough analysis on the quantification of trade-offs between DLT characteristics with different 
configurations. Thus, our results support the development of comprehensive models and simulations of DLT 
designs, which has only partially been approached so far (e.g., [101,164]). The results of such analysis 
support the assessment of the influence of the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics on 
applications on DLT. Research on the application of DLT is supported in the decision making for a particular 
DLT design. Researchers and practitioners obtain deep insight into viability of DLT designs for applications 
on DLT and their possible impact on organizations based. Thus, research, for example, on business process 
innovation using DLT can draw from the trade-offs and archetypes to discuss possible negative effects of the 
integration of DLT. Furthermore, we contribute to research on software engineering and requirements 
engineering in distributed systems since a holistic view on non-functional requirements can be obtained 
beforehand. Finally, we support the forth research stream guidance by introducing the archetypes of DLT 
design. The generated archetypes can form a fundament for a preselection of DLT designs and can support 
the selection of an appropriate DLT design (e.g., [125]) to make the selection of a DLT design more efficient. 
The integration of the identified trade-offs and generated archetypes into such decision-support processes 
enables the investigation of which of the identified DLT characteristics should be communicated in which 
way with users of the decision-support process to make decision-support processes even comprehensible for 
novices. Thus, a foundation for the investigation of design patterns for a comprehensive decision-support for 
the selection of a DLT design is provided. 
5.4 Limitations 
As with any study, our study has some limitations. The identified DLT characteristics were solely identified 
in a literature review in field the of DLT. Analyzed DLT concepts are limited to already published scientific 
articles and mainly focus on blockchain. Therefore, we limit our overview of DLT characteristics that are 
currently of particular interest in research on DLT for the development of applications. However, derived 
DLT characteristics can also be found in multiple white papers of DLT designs such as EOS [43], GoChain 
[55], IOTA [127], Spectre [144], and Tezos [57]. Most of the analyzed research articles that describe 
implementational work developed applications on Bitcoin [109], Ethereum [22], or HyperLedger Fabric [4] 
which makes our work (in particular the identified trade-offs) only partially generalizable to other DLT 
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designs. Several trade-offs have been derived under consideration of scientific literature in the field of 
distributed systems and should be analyzed to determine their impact on applications on DLT. While we 
analyzed dependencies between DLT, we focused on potential negative effects and resulting trade-offs. We 
acknowledge that dependencies might also lead to complementary, positive effects, which might be analyzed 
in future research. 
Until the time of writing, only few papers in the research streams analysis and guidance have been published, 
which consider blockDAGs or TDAG. However, there are first approaches for the analysis of such DLT 
concepts as formalization for frameworks for the simulation of such DAGs emerged (e.g., [164]). However, 
we could not identify trade-offs between DLT characteristics that are specific for such DLT concepts based 
on the found literature. 
5.5 Future Research 
We identified multiple conditions, which impact the intensity of certain dependencies or even the presence 
of trade-offs between DLT characteristics such as the applied consensus mechanism or the use of additional 
services such as mixing (e.g., regarding the trade-off unidentifiability vs. throughput (J.1)). Thus, the analysis 
research stream should conduct measurements to quantify the identified trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics under different conditions. The analysis should include other DLT concepts than blockchain 
to reveal dependencies between DLT characteristics for different data structures. The conduction of such 
analysis supports the quantification of the dependencies between DLT characteristics, which can be used to 
finally express the influence of the particular trade-offs between DLT characteristics. Quantified trade-offs 
support the development of holistic decision-support for the selection of DLT designs for applications within 
the guidance research stream. Based on a quantified model of the trade-offs, monitoring-systems for 
distributed ledgers can be developed, which can use the generated trade-offs to predict the behavior of a 
distributed ledger. Researchers on the application of DLT can further investigate how to design such 
decision-support and monitoring applications. Knowledge on how to communicate the system behavior of a 
distributed ledger to users of a DLT application can increase trust towards DLT. Several DLT characteristics 
can hardly be measured (e.g., governance, cost). Therefore, more detailed and testable criteria must be 
generated according to requirements of a particular application on DLT to evaluate the achievement of such 
DLT characteristics. 
In the evolvement of DLT designs, interoperability becomes obviously a crucial DLT characteristic. 
Especially, interoperability between DLT designs is of particular interest to increase throughput, to enable 
scalability, and to increase flexibility of applications on DLT [12,21,26,99]. Drawing from the discussed 
inherent trade-offs of particular DLT designs, the effects of such trade-offs in the context of interoperability 
should be investigated in future research. For example, the combination of DLT designs, one providing total 
finality and the other only probabilistic finality, may challenge atomicity and cause a loss of transferred assets 
as transactions are not finalized on both ledgers. Furthermore, interoperability between DLT designs has the 
potential to increase security of DLT designs through merged mining using sidechains (e.g., in Rootstock 
[91]). Thus, the analysis of trade-offs coming from the interoperability of DLT designs appears crucial for 
the development of even more flexible applications on DLT. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This work shows that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all DLT design due to diverse DLT characteristics and 
prevalent trade-offs at the current state of DLT. Because it is difficult to consider all the trade-offs and their 
particular impact at once, we presented archetypes of DLT designs to make the trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics more tangible. The generated DLT design archetypes support practitioners to understand 
causes of drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the selection of a DLT design. Due to the 
presentation of the trade-offs and their consolidation into archetypes, the configuration of a DLT design 
becomes more transparent for developers, which can ultimately prevent wrong decisions for the selection of 
a DLT design. 
30 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Daniel Abadi. 2012. Consistency Tradeoffs in Modern Distributed Database System Design: CAP is 
Only Part of the Story. Computer 45, 2 (February 2012), 37–42. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2012.33 
[2] All In Bits, Inc. 2019. Tendermint Documentation. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://tendermint.com/docs/introduction/ 
[3] Ittai Anati, Shay Gueron, Simon P. Johnson, and Vincent R. Scarlata. 2014. Innovative Technology 
for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on 
Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy. 
[4] Elli Androulaki, Artem Barger, Vita Bortnikov, Christian Cachin, Konstantinos Christidis, Angelo De 
Caro, David Enyeart, Christopher Ferris, Gennady Laventman, Yacov Manevich, Srinivasan 
Muralidharan, Chet Murthy, Binh Nguyen, Manish Sethi, Gari Singh, Keith Smith, Alessandro 
Sorniotti, Chrysoula Stathakopoulou, Marko Vukolić, Sharon Weed Cocco, and Jason Yellick. 2018. 
Hyperledger Fabric: A Distributed Operating System for Permissioned Blockchains. In 13th EuroSys 
Conference (EuroSys ’18), 1–15. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3190508.3190538 
[5] Stefano De Angelis, Leonardo Aniello, Roberto Baldoni, Federico Lombardi, Andrea Margheri, and 
Vladimiro Sassone. 2018. PBFT vs proof-of-authority: applying the CAP theorem to permissioned 
blockchain. Retrieved from https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/415083/ 
[6] Ashiq Anjum, Manu Sporny, and Alan Sill. 2017. Blockchain Standards for Compliance and Trust. 
IEEE Cloud Computing 4, 4 (July 2017), 84–90. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MCC.2017.3791019 
[7] Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, and Laurent Vanbever. 2017. Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on 
Cryptocurrencies. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 375–392. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.29 
[8] ARK.io. 2019. ARK Ecosystem Whitepaper. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://ark.io/Whitepaper.pdf 
[9] Nicola Atzei, Massimo Bartoletti, and Tiziana Cimoli. 2016. A survey of attacks on Ethereum smart 
contracts. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/atzei2016survey.pdf 
[10] Asaph Azaria, Ariel Ekblaw, Thiago Vieira, and Andrew Lippman. 2016. MedRec: Using Blockchain 
for Medical Data Access and Permission Management. In 2016 2nd International Conference on Open 
and Big Data, 25–30. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/OBD.2016.11 
[11] Adam Back. 1997. A partial hash collision based postage scheme. Retrieved December 29, 2018 from 
http://www.hashcash.org/papers/announce.txt 
[12] Adam Back, Matt Corallo, Luke Dashjr, Mark Friedenbach, Gregory Maxwell, Andrew Miller, 
Andrew Poelstra, Jorge Timón, and Pieter Wuille. 2014. Enabling blockchain innovations with pegged 
sidechains. http://www.opensciencereview.com/papers/123/enablingblockchain-innovations-with-
pegged-sidechains (2014). 
[13] Artem Barger, Yacov Manevich, Benjamin Mandler, Vita Bortnikov, Gennady Laventman, and 
Gregory Chockler. 2017. Scalable Communication Middleware for Permissioned Distributed Ledgers. 
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM International Systems and Storage Conference (SYSTOR ’17), 23:1–
23:1. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3078468.3078492 
[14] Roman Beck, Christoph Müller-Bloch, and John Leslie King. 2018. Governance in the Blockchain 
Economy: A Framework and Research Agenda. Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
19, (2018), 1020–1034. DOI:https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00518 
[15] Joseph Bonneau. 2016. Why Buy When You Can Rent? In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 
19–26. 
[16] Cody Born. 2018. Ethereum Proof-of-Authority on Azure. Microsoft Azure. Retrieved May 15, 2019 
from https://web.archive.org/web/20190501134839/https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/ethereum-
proof-of-authority-on-azure/ 
[17] Vanessa Bracamonte and Hitoshi Okada. 2017. The issue of user trust in decentralized applications 
running on blockchain platforms. In 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society, 
1–4. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ISTAS.2017.8318975 
[18] Eric Alan Brewer. 2000. Towards robust distributed systems (abstract). In Proceedings of the 19th 
Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC ’00), 7. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/343477.343502 
31 
 
[19] Jan vom Brocke, Alexander Simons, Kai Riemer, Bjoern Niehaves, and Ralf Platfaut. 2015. Standing 
on the Shoulders of Giants: Challenges and Recommendations of Literature Search in Information 
Systems Research. Communications of the Association for Information Systems 37, 9 (2015), 205–224. 
[20] Richard Gendal Brown, James Carlyle, Ian Grigg, and Mike Hearn. 2016. Corda: An Introduction. 
Retrieved January 5, 2019 from https://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-introductory-whitepaper.pdf 
[21] Vitalik Buterin. 2016. Chain Interoperability [white paper]. Retrieved from 
http://www.r3cev.com/s/Chain-Interoperability-8g6f.pdf 
[22] Vitalik Buterin. 2018. Ethereum Whitepaper. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from 
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper/f18902f4e7fb21dc92b37e8a0963eec4b3f4793a 
[23] Filip Caron. 2018. The Evolving Payments Landscape: Technological Innovation in Payment Systems. 
IT Professional 20, 2 (March 2018), 53–61. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2018.021921651 
[24] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. 1999. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In Proceedings of the 
Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’99), 173–186. Retrieved 
from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=296806.296824 
[25] Ethan Cecchetti, Fan Zhang, Yan Ji, Ahmed Kosba, Ari Juels, and Elaine Shi. 2017. Solidus: 
Confidential Distributed Ledger Transactions via PVORM. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’17), 701–717. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134010 
[26] Shiping Chen, Harry Wang, Liang-Jie Zhang, Gwan-Hwan Hwang, Po-Han Chen, Chun-Hao Lu, Chun 
Chiu, Hsuan-Cheng Lin, and An-Jie Jheng (Eds.). 2018. InfiniteChain: A Multi-chain Architecture 
with Distributed Auditing of Sidechains for Public Blockchains. Retrieved from 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-94478-4.pdf 
[27] Michael Coblenz. 2017. Obsidian: A Safer Blockchain Programming Language. In Proceedings of the 
39th International Conference on Software Engineering Companion (ICSE-C ’17), 97–99. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSE-C.2017.150 
[28] Cindy Compert, Maurizio Luinetti, and Bertrand Portier. 2018. Blockchain and GDPR-How 
blockchain could address five areas associated with GDPR compliance.  
[29] Juliet M. Corbin and Anselm L. Strauss. 2015. Basics of qualitative research: techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (4th ed.). Los Angeles. 
[30] Gaby G. Dagher, Jordan Mohler, Matea Milojkovic, and Praneeth Babu Marella. 2018. Ancile: 
Privacy-preserving framework for access control and interoperability of electronic health records using 
blockchain technology. Sustainable Cities and Society 39, (2018), 283–297. 
[31] Mingjun Dai, Shengli Zhang, Hu Wang, and Shi Jin. 2018. A Low Storage Room Requirement 
Framework for Distributed Ledger in Blockchain. IEEE Access 6, (2018), 22970–22975. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2814624 
[32] Patrick Dai, Neil Mahi, Jordan Earls, and Alex Norta. Smart-Contract Value-Transfer Protocols on 
aDistributed Mobile Application Platform.  
[33] Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer. 2013. Information propagation in the Bitcoin network. In 
IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings, 1–10. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2013.6688704 
[34] Evangelos Deirmentzoglou, Georgios Papakyriakopoulos, and Constantinos Patsakis. 2019. A Survey 
on Long-Range Attacks for Proof of Stake Protocols. IEEE Access 7, (2019), 28712–28725. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2901858 
[35] Giuseppe Destefanis, Michele Marchesi, Marco Ortu, Roberto Tonelli, Andrea Bracciali, and Robert 
Hierons. 2018. Smart contracts vulnerabilities: a call for blockchain software engineering? In 2018 
International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering, 19–25. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBOSE.2018.8327567 
[36] Jega Anish Dev. 2014. Bitcoin mining acceleration and performance quantification. In 2014 IEEE 27th 
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, 1–6. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/CCECE.2014.6900989 
[37] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. 2004. Tor: The Second-Generation Onion 
Router.  
[38] Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Rui Liu, Meihui Zhang, Gang Chen, Beng Chin Ooi, and Beng Chin Ooi. 2018. 
Untangling Blockchain: A Data Processing View of Blockchain Systems. IEEE Transactions on 
Knowledge and Data Engineering 30, 7 (2018), 1–20. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2017.2781227 
[39] Dvora Dolev. 2019. Distributed Commit with Bounded Waiting. (2019). 
32 
 
[40] John R. Douceur. 2002. The Sybil Attack. In Revised Papers from the First International Workshop 
on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS ’01), 251–260. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646334.687813 
[41] Evan Duffield and Daniel Dia. 2019. Dash: A Privacy--Centric Crypto-Currency. Retrieved May 16, 
2019 from https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Dash-Whitepaper.pdf 
[42] Nitesh Emmadi and Harika Narumanchi. 2017. Reinforcing Immutability of Permissioned Blockchains 
with Keyless Signatures’ Infrastructure. 1–6. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3007748.3018280 
[43] EOS.IO. 2018. EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2. Retrieved March 12, 2019 from 
https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md 
[44] Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer. 2014. Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable. In 
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Nicolas Christin and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, (eds.). 
Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243 
[45] Michael J. Fischer, Nancy A. Lynch, and Michael S. Paterson. 1985. Impossibility of distributed 
consensus with one faulty process. Journal of the ACM 32, 2 (April 1985), 374–382. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3149.214121 
[46] Bogdan Cristian Florea. 2018. Blockchain and Internet of Things data provider for smart applications. 
In 2018 7th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing, 1–4. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO.2018.8406041 
[47] Kai Foerstl, Martin C. Schleper, and Michael Henke. 2017. Purchasing and supply management: From 
efficiency to effectiveness in an integrated supply chain. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management 23, 4 (2017), 223–228. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2017.08.004 
[48] Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. 2015. The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis 
and Applications. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015, 281–310. 
[49] Arthur Gervais, Ghassan O. Karame, Karl Wüst, Vasileios Glykantzis, Hubert Ritzdorf, and Srdjan 
Capkun. 2016. On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains. In Proceedings of the 
2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’16), 3–16. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978341 
[50] Seth Gilbert and Nancy Lynch. 2002. Brewer’s conjecture and the feasibility of consistent, available, 
partition-tolerant web services. ACM SIGACT News 33, 2 (June 2002), 51. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/564585.564601 
[51] Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. 2009. The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for 
qualitative research (4. paperback printing ed.). Aldine, New Brunswick. 
[52] Florian Glaser and Luis Bezzenberger. 2015. Beyond Cryptocurrencies - A Taxonomy of 
Decentralized Consensus Systems. In 23rd European Conference on Information Systems, 1–18. 
[53] Johannes Göbel, Paul Keeler, Anthony E. Krzesinski, and Peter G. Taylor. 2016. Bitcoin blockchain 
dynamics: The selfish-mine strategy in the presence of propagation delay. Performance Evaluation 
104, (October 2016), 23–41. 
[54] Johannes Göbel and Anthony E. Krzesinski. 2017. Increased block size and Bitcoin blockchain 
dynamics. In 2017 27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference, 1–
6. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ATNAC.2017.8215367 
[55] GoChain. 2018. Proof of Reputation. Retrieved February 21, 2019 from 
https://medium.com/gochain/proof-of-reputation-e37432420712 
[56] GoChain Foundation. 2019. Official GoChain Documentation. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190516083054/https://github.com/gochain-io/docs 
[57] L. M. Goodman. 2018. Tezos — a self-amending crypto-ledger White paper. Retrieved May 16, 2019 
from https://tezos.com/static/white_paper-2dc8c02267a8fb86bd67a108199441bf.pdf 
[58] Neville Grech, Michael Kong, Anton Jurisevic, Lexi Brent, Bernhard Scholz, and Yannis Smaragdakis. 
2018. MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts. Proceedings of the ACM 
on Programming Languages 2, OOPSLA (October 2018), 1–27. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3276486 
[59] Harry Halpin. 2017. NEXTLEAP: Decentralizing Identity with Privacy for Secure Messaging. In 
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES ’17), 
92:1–92:10. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3098954.3104056 
[60] Runchao Han, Vincent Gramoli, and Xiwei Xu. 2018. Evaluating Blockchains for IoT. In 2018 9th 
IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, 1–5. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS.2018.8328736 
33 
 
[61] Ethan Heilman, Alison Kendler, Aviv Zohar, and Sharon Goldberg. 2015. Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s 
Peer-to-peer Network. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium 
(SEC’15), 129–144. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2831143.2831152 
[62] Maurice Herlihy. 2018. Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps. In (PODC ’18), 245–254. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3212734.3212736 
[63] Garrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs. 2017. 2017 Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study. SSRN 
Electronic Journal (2017). DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3040224 
[64] Micha R. Hoffman. 2018. Can Blockchains and Linked Data Advance Taxation. In Companion of the 
The Web Conference 2018 on The Web Conference 2018 (WWW ’18), 1179–1182. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3184558.3191555 
[65] Frank Hofmann, Simone Wurster, Eyal Ron, and Moritz Böhmecke-Schwafert. 2017. The 
immutability concept of blockchains and benefits of early standardization. In ITU Kaleidoscope: 
Challenges for a Data-Driven Society, 1–8. DOI:https://doi.org/10.23919/ITU-WT.2017.8247004 
[66] Daira Hopwood, Sean Bowe, Taylor Hornby, and Nathan Wilcox. 2018. Zcash Protocol Specification. 
Retrieved May 5, 2019 from https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/z-cash-zec-
whitepaper.pdf 
[67] Howard Shrobe, David L. Shrier, and Alex Pentland. 2018. CHAPTER 15 Enigma: Decentralized 
Computation Platform with Guaranteed Privacy. In New Solutions for Cybersecurity. MIT Press, 504. 
Retrieved from http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=8333139 
[68] Seyoung Huh, Sangrae Cho, and Soohyung Kim. 2017. Managing IoT devices using blockchain 
platform. In 19th International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology, 464–467. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.23919/ICACT.2017.7890132 
[69] Hyperledger Architecture Working Group. 2017. Hyperledger  Architecture, Volume 1. Retrieved May 
16, 2019 from https://www.hyperledger.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/HyperLedger_Arch_WG_Paper_1_Consensus.pdf 
[70] Intel Corporation. 2015. PoET 1.0 Specification. Retrieved February 5, 2019 from 
https://sawtooth.hyperledger.org/docs/core/releases/1.0/architecture/poet.html 
[71] ISO. 1989. Information processing systems — Open Systems Interconnection — Basic Reference 
Model — Part 2: Security Architecture.  
[72] ISO/IEC. 2011. Systems and software engineering — Systems and software Quality Requirements and 
Evaluation (SQuaRE) — System and software quality models. ISO/IEC 25010:2011. 
[73] Karim Jabbar and Pernille Bjørn. 2018. Infrastructural Grind: Introducing Blockchain Technology in 
the Shipping Domain. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Supporting Groupwork 
(GROUP ’18), 297–308. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3148330.3148345 
[74] Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels. 1999. Proofs of Work and Bread Pudding Protocols. In Proceedings 
of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Joint Working Conference on Secure Information Networks: Communications 
and Multimedia Security (CMS ’99), 258–272. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=647800.757199 
[75] Hai Jin, Jiang Xiao, and Xiaohai Dai (Eds.). 2018. Towards a Novel Architecture for Enabling 
Interoperability amongst Multiple Blockchains. In 2018 IEEE 38th International Conference on 
Distributed Computing Systems. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2018.00120 
[76] J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 2016. Quorum Whitepaper. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://github.com/jpmorganchase/quorum-docs/blob/master/Quorum%20Whitepaper%20v0.1.pdf 
[77] J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 2018. J.P. Morgan Interbank Information NetworkSM Expands to More than 
75 Banks. Retrieved March 12, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/detail/1320570135560 
[78] Niclas Kannengießer, Sebastian Lins, Tobias Dehling, and Ali Sunyaev. 2019. What Does Not Fit Can 
be Made to Fit! Trade-Offs in Distributed Ledger Technology Designs. 
DOI:http://hdl.handle.net/10125/60143 
[79] Merve Can Kus Khalilov and Albert Levi. 2018. A Survey on Anonymity and Privacy in Bitcoin-like 
Digital Cash Systems. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials (2018), 1–44. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2018.2818623 
[80] Lucianna Kiffer, Dave Levin, and Alan Mislove. 2017. Stick a Fork in It: Analyzing the Ethereum 
Network Partition. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, 94–100. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3152434.3152449 
34 
 
[81] Barbara Kitchenham, O. Pearl Brereton, David Budgen, Mark Turner, John Bailey, and Stephen 
Linkman. 2009. Systematic Literature Reviews in Software Engineering - A Systematic Literature 
Review. INFORM SOFTWARE TECH 51, 1 (January 2009), 7–15. 
[82] Ahmed Kosba, Andrew Miller, Elaine Shi, Zikai Wen, and Charalampos Papamanthou. 2016. Hawk: 
The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts. In 2016 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 839–858. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2016.55 
[83] Djamel Eddine Kouicem, Abdelmadjid Bouabdallah, and Hicham Lakhlef. 2018. Internet of things 
security: A top-down survey. Computer Networks (2018). 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2018.03.012 
[84] Heiko Koziolek. 2011. Sustainability evaluation of software architectures: a systematic review. In 
Proceedings of the joint ACM SIGSOFT conference -- QoSA and ACM SIGSOFT symposium -- 
ISARCS on Quality of software architectures -- QoSA and architecting critical systems -- ISARCS - 
QoSA-ISARCS ’11, 3. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2000259.2000263 
[85] David Burth Kurka and Jeremy Pitt. 2017. Smart-CPR: Self-Organisation and Self-Governance in the 
Sharing Economy. In 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of 
Self* Systems (FAS*W), 85–90. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/FAS-W.2017.125 
[86] Steven R. Kursh and Natalia A. Gold. 2016. Adding FinTech and Blockchain to Your Curriculum. 
Business Education Innovation Journal 8, 2 (December 2016), 6–12. 
[87] Mary C. Lacity, Shaji Khan, Aihua Yan, and Leslie P. Willcocks. 2010. A review of the IT outsourcing 
empirical literature and future research directions. Journal of Information Technology 25, 4 (2010), 
395–433. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2010.21 
[88] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. 1982. The Byzantine Generals Problem. ACM 
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 4, 3 (July 1982), 382–401. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/357172.357176 
[89] Tomi Lehikoinen. 2018. Food Supply Chain This summer, fishing in Finland means food traceability 
on the menu. IBM Blockchain Blog. Retrieved January 4, 2019 from 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/07/this-summer-fishing-in-finland-means-food-
traceability-on-the-menu/ 
[90] Ao Lei, Haitham Cruickshank, Yue Cao, Philip Asuquo, Chibueze P. Anyigor Ogah, and Zhili Sun. 
2017. Blockchain-Based Dynamic Key Management for Heterogeneous Intelligent Transportation 
Systems. IEEE Internet of Things Journal 4, 6 (December 2017), 1832–1843. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2017.2740569 
[91] Sergio Demian Lerner. 2015. RSK - Bitcoin powered Smart Contracts. Retrieved May 23, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180916092235/https://docs.rsk.co/RSK_White_Paper-Overview.pdf 
[92] Xiaoqi Li, Peng Jiang, Ting Chen, Xiapu Luo, and Qiaoyan Wen. 2017. A survey on the security of 
blockchain systems. Future Generation Computer Systems (2017), 1–13. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.08.020 
[93] Xueping Liang, Sachin Shetty, Deepak Tosh, Charles Kamhoua, Kevin Kwiat, and Laurent Njilla. 
2017. ProvChain: A Blockchain-based Data Provenance Architecture in Cloud Environment with 
Enhanced Privacy and Availability. In Proceedings of the 17th IEEE/ACM International Symposium 
on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (CCGrid ’17), 468–477. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/CCGRID.2017.8 
[94] Claudio Lima. 2018. Developing Open and Interoperable DLT\/Blockchain Standards [Standards]. 
Computer 51, 11 (November 2018), 106–111. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2018.2876184 
[95] Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 
Calif. 
[96] Shijun Liu, Bedir Tekinerdogan, Mikio Aoyama, Liang-Jie Zhang, Liping Deng, Huan Chen, and Jing 
Zeng (Eds.). 2018. Research on Cross-Chain Technology Based on Sidechain and Hash-Locking. 
Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-94340-4.pdf 
[97] Yio Liu, ingtong Liu, Chaojing Tang, Jian Wang, and Lei Zhang. 2018. Unlinkable Coin Mixing 
Scheme For Transaction Privacy Enhancement of Bitcoin. IEEE Access (2018), 1–1. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2827163 
[98] Jack Lu, Boris Yang, Zane Liang, Ying Zhang, Demmon Shi, Eric Swartz, and Lizzie Lu. 2017. 
Wanchain. Retrieved from https://wanchain.org/files/Wanchain-Whitepaper-EN-version.pdf 
[99] Loi Luu, Viswesh Narayanan, Chaodong Zheng, Kunal Baweja, Seth Gilbert, and Prateek Saxena. 
2016. A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains. In ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security, 17–30. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978389 
35 
 
[100] Lukas Malina, Jan Hajny, Radek Fujdiak, and Jiri Hosek. 2016. On perspective of security and privacy-
preserving solutions in the internet of things. Computer Networks 102, (June 2016), 83–95. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2016.03.011 
[101] Diego Marmsoler and Leo Eichhorn. 2018. Simulation-Based Analysis of Blockchain Architectures. 
Unpublished (2018). DOI:https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.19898.44481 
[102] Demiro Massessi. 2018. Public Vs Private Blockchain In A Nutshell. Medium. Retrieved May 5, 2019 
from https://medium.com/coinmonks/public-vs-private-blockchain-in-a-nutshell-c9fe284fa39f 
[103] Jan Mendling, Ingo Weber, Wil Van Der Aalst, Jan Vom Brocke, Cristina Cabanillas, Florian Daniel, 
Søren Debois, Claudio Di Ciccio, Marlon Dumas, Schahram Dustdar, Avigdor Gal, Luciano García-
Bañuelos, Guido Governatori, Richard Hull, Marcello La Rosa, Henrik Leopold, Frank Leymann, Jan 
Recker, Manfred Reichert, Hajo A. Reijers, Stefanie Rinderle-Ma, Andreas Solti, Michael Rosemann, 
Stefan Schulte, Munindar P. Singh, Tijs Slaats, Mark Staples, Barbara Weber, Matthias Weidlich, 
Mathias Weske, Xiwei Xu, and Liming Zhu. 2018. Blockchains for Business Process Management - 
Challenges and Opportunities. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems 9, 1 (February 
2018), 4:1–4:16. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3183367 
[104] Dan Middleton. 2016. Meet Sawtooth Lake. Hyperledger Sawtooth. Retrieved May 15, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.hyperledger.org/blog/2016/11/02/meet-sawtooth-lake 
[105] Andrew Miller, Yu Xia, Kyle Croman, Elaine Shi, and Dawn Song. 2016. The Honey Badger of BFT 
Protocols. 31–42. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978399 
[106] Du Mingxiao, Ma Xiaofeng, Zhe Zhe, Wang Xiangwei, and Chen Qijun. 2017. A review on consensus 
algorithm of blockchain. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 
2567–2572. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC.2017.8123011 
[107] Paul P. Momtaz. 2018. Token Sales and Initial Coin Offerings: Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal 
(2018). DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277707 
[108] Malte Möser, Kyle Soska, Ethan Heilman, Kevin Lee, Henry Heffan, Shashvat Srivastava, Kyle 
Hogan, Jason Hennessey, Andrew Miller, Arvind Narayanan, and Nicolas Christin. 2018. An 
Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies 2018, 3 (2018). Retrieved from 
https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/popets/2018/3/article-p143.xml 
[109] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2008. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. Retrieved June 11, 2018 
from https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
[110] Christopher Natoli and Vincent Gramoli. 2016. The Blockchain Anomaly. In 2016 IEEE 15th 
International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, 310–317. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2016.7778635 
[111] Chrsitopher Natoli and Vincent Gramoli. 2017. The Balance Attack or Why Forkable Blockchains are 
Ill-Suited for Consortium. In 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks, 579–590. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2017.44 
[112] Brian Neil Levine, Clay Shields, and N Boris Margolin. 2005. A Survey of Solutions to the Sybil attack.  
[113] Ricardo Neisse, Gary Steri, and Igor Nai-Fovino. 2017. A Blockchain-based Approach for Data 
Accountability and Provenance Tracking. In 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability 
and Security, 1–10. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3098954.3098958 
[114] Jude Nelson, Muneeb Ali, Ryan Shea, and Michael J. Freedman. 2016. Extending Existing 
Blockchains with Virtualchain. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://www.zurich.ibm.com/dccl/papers/nelson_dccl.pdf 
[115] NewsBTC. 2018. Increased SegWit Adoption for Bitcoin, is Lightning Network Next? NewsBTC. 
Retrieved April 9, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190410173449/https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/03/01/segwit-
adoption-lightning-network-increases-bitcoin/ 
[116] Gene Neyer and Benjamin Geva. 2017. Blockchain and payment systems: What are the benefits and 
costs? Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 11, 3 (Autumn/Fall2017 2017), 215–225. 
[117] Odhran O’Donoghue, Anuraag A. Vazirani, David Brindley, and Edward Meinert. 2019. Design 
Choices and Trade-Offs in Health Care Blockchain Implementations: Systematic Review. Journal of 
Medical Internet Research 21, 5 (May 2019), e12426. DOI:https://doi.org/10.2196/12426 
[118] oraclize. 2019. oraclize Documentary. Retrieved May 21, 2019 from https://provable.xyz/ 
36 
 
[119] Pim Otte, Martijn de Vos, and Johan Pouwelse. 2017. TrustChain: A Sybil-resistant scalable 
blockchain. Future Generation Computer Systems (2017). 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.08.048 
[120] Philipp Paech. 2017. The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks. Modern Law Review 80, 6 
(November 2017), 1073–1110. 
[121] Paige Cabianca. 2018. What’s the difference between Public, Private and Permissioned Blockchains? 
Medium. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from https://medium.com/nakamo-to/whats-the-difference-between-
a-public-and-a-private-blockchain-c08d6d1886a0 
[122] Guy Paré, Marie Claude Trudel, Mirou Jaana, and Spyros Kitsiou. 2015. Synthesizing information 
systems knowledge: A typology of literature reviews. Information and Management 52, 2 (2015), 183–
199. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2014.08.008 
[123] R. Pass and E. Shi. 2017. Rethinking Large-Scale Consensus. In 2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security 
Foundations Symposium, 115–129. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.37 
[124] Rafael Pass and Elaine Shi. 2017. The Sleepy Model of Consensus. In Advances in Cryptology – 
ASIACRYPT 2017, 380–409. 
[125] Morgen E. Peck. 2017. Blockchain world - Do you need a blockchain? This chart will tell you if the 
technology can solve your problem. IEEE Spectrum 54, 10 (October 2017), 38–60. 
[126] Udo Pesch and Georgy Ishmaev. 2019. Fictions and frictions: Promises, transaction costs and the 
innovation of network technologies. Social Studies of Science 49, 2 (April 2019), 264–277. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312719838339 
[127] Serguei Popov. 2018. The Tangle. Retrieved June 11, 2018 from 
https://assets.ctfassets.net/r1dr6vzfxhev/2t4uxvsIqk0EUau6g2sw0g/45eae33637ca92f85dd9f4a3a218
e1ec/iota1_4_3.pdf 
[128] Matevž Pustišek and Andrej Kos. 2018. Approaches to Front-End IoT Application Development for 
the Ethereum Blockchain. Procedia Computer Science 129, (2018), 410–419. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2018.03.017 
[129] Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias Kougianos, and Chi Yang. 2018. The 
Blockchain as a Decentralized Security Framework [Future Directions]. IEEE Consumer Electronics 
Magazine 7, 2 (March 2018), 18–21. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MCE.2017.2776459 
[130] Qtum Foundation. 2017. Qtum Technical Whitepaper (draft version). Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Qtum-white-paper.pdf 
[131] Siraj Raval. 2016. Decentralized applications: harnessing Bitcoin’s blockchain technology. O’Reilly, 
Beijing ; Boston. 
[132] Paul Rimba, An Binh Tran, Ingo Weber, Mark Staples, Alexander Ponomarev, and Xiwei Xu. 2017. 
Comparing Blockchain and Cloud Services for Business Process Execution. In IEEE International 
Conference on Software Architecture, 257–260. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSA.2017.44 
[133] Ripple. 2017. Solution Overview. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Ripple-XRP-Whitepaper.pdf 
[134] Tom Rodgers. 2019. Ethereum Classic Price Roaring Just Weeks After 51% Attack. Retrieved May 
23, 2019 from https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomrodgers1/2019/04/08/ethereum-classic-price-roaring-
just-weeks-after-51-attack/#2906e2a6f7ef 
[135] Alex Roehrs, Cristiano André da Costa, and Rodrigo da Rosa Righi. 2017. OmniPHR: A distributed 
architecture model to integrate personal health records. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 71, (2017), 
70–81. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2017.05.012 
[136] Nicolas van Saberhagen. 2013. CryptoNote v 2.0. Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf 
[137] Nicolas van Saberhagen. 2013. CryptoNote v 2.0. Retrieved May 2, 2019 from 
https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Monero-whitepaper.pdf 
[138] Kenji Saito and Yamada Hairoyuki. 2016. What’s So Different about Blockchain? — Blockchain is a 
Probabilistic State Machine. In 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems Workshops, 168–175. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2016.28 
[139] seele. 2018. seele Whitepaper. Retrieved May 1, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190505151438/http://seele.hk.ufileos.com/Seele_White_Paper_Englis
h_v3.1.pdf 
37 
 
[140] Shobit Seth. 2018. Alibaba, IBM, MasterCard Top Global Blockchain Patent Rankings. Retrieved May 
28, 2019 from https://www.investopedia.com/news/alibaba-ibm-mastercard-top-global-blockchain-
patent-rankings/ 
[141] Mildred L.G. Shaw and Brian R. Gaines. 1989. Comparing conceptual structures: consensus, conflict, 
correspondence and contrast. Knowledge Acquisition 1, 4 (December 1989), 341–363. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/S1042-8143(89)80010-X 
[142] Alan T. Sherman, Farid Javani, Haibin Zhang, and Enis Golaszewski. 2019. On the Origins and 
Variations of Blockchain Technologies. IEEE Security & Privacy 17, 1 (January 2019), 72–77. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2019.2893730 
[143] Siamak Solat and Maria Potop-Butucaru. 2016. ZeroBlock: Preventing Selfish Mining in Bitcoin. 
(2016). 
[144] Yonatan Sompolinsky, Yoad Lewenberg, and Aviv Zohar. 2018. SPECTRE: Serialization of Proof-
of-work Events: Confirming Transactions viaRecursive Elections. Retrieved April 15, 2019 from 
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~yoni_sompo/pubs/17/SPECTRE.pdf 
[145] Harish Sukhwani, José M. Martínez, Xiaolin Chang, Kishor S. Trivedi, and Andy Rindos. 2017. 
Performance Modeling of PBFT Consensus Process for Permissioned Blockchain Network 
(Hyperledger Fabric). In 2017 IEEE 36th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 253–255. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2017.36 
[146] Tim Swanson. 2015. Consensus-as-a-service: a brief report on the emergence of  permissioned, 
distributed ledger systems. Retrieved January 14, 2019 from https://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf 
[147] The ZILLIQA Team. 2017. The ZILLIQA Technical Whitepaper. Retrieved September 16, 2019 from 
https://docs.zilliqa.com/whitepaper.pdf 
[148] Stefan Thomas and Evan Schwartz. 2015. A protocol for interledger payments [white paper]. Retrieved 
November 11, 2018 from http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/interledger.pdf 
[149] Feng Tian. 2016. An agri-food supply chain traceability system for China based on RFID & blockchain 
technology. In 2016 13th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, 1–
6. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2016.7538424 
[150] Alin Tomescu and Srinivas Devadas. 2017. Catena: Efficient Non-equivocation via Bitcoin. In 2017 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 393–409. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.19 
[151] Florian Tschorsch and Bjorn Scheuermann. 2016. Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on 
Decentralized Digital Currencies. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 18, 3 (2016), 2084–
2123. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2016.2535718 
[152] Stephan Tual. 2016. The Ethereum Chain Hard Fork and Immutability Debate. Medium. Retrieved 
from https://blog.stephantual.com/the-ethereum-chain-hard-fork-a419b83ba753 
[153] Andreas Unterweger, Fabian Knirsch, Christoph Leixnering, and Dominik Engel. 2018. Lessons 
Learned from Implementing a Privacy-Preserving Smart Contract in Ethereum. In 9th IFIP 
International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, 1–5. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS.2018.8328739 
[154] Peter Vessenes. 2016. Ethereum Griefing Wallets: Send w/Throw Is Dangerous. Retrieved January 14, 
2019 from https://web.archive.org/web/20190114181554/https://vessenes.com/ethereum-griefing-
wallets-send-w-throw-considered-harmful/ 
[155] Ingo Weber, Vincent Gramoli, Alex Ponomarev, Mark Staples, Ralph Holz, An Binh Tran, and Paul 
Rimba. 2017. On Availability for Blockchain-Based Systems. In 2017 IEEE 36th Symposium on 
Reliable Distributed Systems, 64–73. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2017.15 
[156] Maximilian Wohrer and Uwe Zdun. 2018. Smart contracts: security patterns in the ethereum ecosystem 
and solidity. In 2018 International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering, 2–8. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBOSE.2018.8327565 
[157] Gavin Wood. 2016. Polkadot. Retrieved from https://icowhitepapers.co/wp-
content/uploads/PolkaDot-Whitepaper.pdf 
[158] Karl Wüst and Arthur Gervais. 2017. Do you need a Blockchain? Retrieved May 16, 2019 from 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/375.pdf 
[159] Xiwei Xu, Cesare Pautasso, Liming Zhu, Vincent Gramoli, Alexander Ponomarev, An Binh Tran, and 
Shiping Chen Chen. 2016. The Blockchain as a Software Connector. In 2016 13th Working IEEE/IFIP 
Conference on Software Architecture, 182–191. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/WICSA.2016.21 
38 
 
[160] Xiwei Xu, Ingo Weber, Mark Staples, Liming Zhu, Jan Bosch, Len Bass, Cesare Pautasso, and Paul 
Rimba. 2017. A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design. In IEEE 
International Conference on Software Architecture, 243–252. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSA.2017.33 
[161] Peter Yeoh. 2017. Regulatory issues in blockchain technology. Journal of Financial Regulation & 
Compliance 25, 2 (April 2017), 196–208. 
[162] Kimchai Yeow, Abdullah Gani, Raja Wasim Ahmad, Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues, and Kwangman Ko. 
2018. Decentralized Consensus for Edge-Centric Internet of Things: A Review, Taxonomy, and 
Research Issues. IEEE Access 6, (2018), 1513–1524. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779263 
[163] Jesse Yli-Huumo, Deokyoon Ko, Sujin Choi, Sooyong Park, and Kari Smolander. 2016. Where Is 
Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—A Systematic Review. PLOS ONE 11, 10 (October 
2016), 1–27. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0163477 
[164] Manuel Zander, Tom Waite, and Dominik Harz. 2019. DAGsim: Simulation of DAG-based distributed 
ledger protocols. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3308897.3308951 
[165] Zcash Foundation. 2018. What are zk-SNARKs? Retrieved March 27, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190327145208/https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks 
[166] Fan Zhang, Ethan Cecchetti, Kyle Croman, Ari Juels, and Elaine Shi. 2016. Town Crier: An 
Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’16), 270–282. 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978326 
[167] K. Zhang and H. Jacobsen (Eds.). 2018. Towards Dependable, Scalable, and Pervasive Distributed 
Ledgers with Blockchains. In 2018 IEEE 38th International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2018.00134 
[168] Xiangfu Zhao, Zhongyu Chen, Xin Chen, Yanxia Wang, and Changbing Tang. 2017. The DAO attack 
paradoxes in propositional logic. In 4th International Conference on Systems and Informatics, 1743–
1746. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSAI.2017.8248566 
[169] Zibin Zheng, Shaoan Xie, Hong Ning Dai, Xiangping Chen, and Huaimin Wang. 2018. Blockchain 
challenges and opportunities: a survey. International Journal of Web and Grid Services 14, 4 (2018), 
352. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1504/IJWGS.2018.095647 
[170] Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Fred Grossmann, Martin Henze, Nicolas Inden, and Klaus Wehrle. 2015. 
CoinParty: Secure Multi-Party Mixing of Bitcoins. In 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application 
Security and Privacy (CODASPY ’15), 75–86. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699100 
[171] Igor Zikratov, Alexander Kuzmin, Vladislav Akimenko, Viktor Niculichev, and Lucas Yalansky. 
2017. Ensuring data integrity using blockchain technology. In 2017 20th Conference of Open 
Innovations Association, 534–539. DOI:https://doi.org/10.23919/FRUCT.2017.8071359 
[172] Adrian Zmudzinski. 2019. Ethereum Core Developers Consider More Frequent and Smaller Hard 
Forks. Ethereum Core Developers Consider More Frequent and Smaller Hard Forks. Retrieved April 
21, 2019 from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190416064521/https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-core-
developers-consider-more-frequent-and-smaller-hard-forks 
[173] Nejc Zupan, Kaiwen Zhang, and Hans-Arno Jacobsen. 2017. Hyperpubsub: a decentralized, 
permissioned, publish/subscribe service using blockchains: demo. In 18th ACM/IFIP/USENIX 
Middleware Conference: Posters and Demos, 15–16. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3155016.3155018 
  
39 
 
A APPENDICES 
A.1 Attacks on DLT Designs 
Name Description Target 
51 % Attack In a 51 % attack, an adversary aims to control more than 50 % of all nodes to (partially) 
rewrite the transaction history of a distributed ledger. 51 % attacks can occur in probabilistic 
consensus mechanisms such as Nakamoto consensus [44]. 
Majority-based DLT 
designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Balance 
Attack 
In a Balance attack, an adversary transiently disrupts communications between subgroups 
of miners with equal mining power to outweigh the blockchain branch she submitted 
transactions to with the blockchain branch she participates in the mining process and to 
eventually rewrite transaction history [111]. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Blockchain 
Anomaly 
The blockchain anomaly describes the phenomenon that a transaction ti gets committed and, 
based on this observation, one issues a new transaction tj knowing that ti was successfully 
committed. Blockchains may finally discard ti and only commit tj, which violates the 
dependency between ti and tj [110]. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Bribery 
Attack 
In a bribery attack, an adversary incentivizes validating nodes to work on a particular branch 
of the DLT design, which the adversary rules to eventually catch up with the main branch 
of the blockchain and, finally, become the main branch [15]. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Double 
Spending 
In a double spending attack, the adversary suggests to a user that a product was payed, while 
transferring the just issued coins back to one self’s wallet. After the fork was resolved, the 
adversary still owns her coins and the product she actually not payed for [109]. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Eclipse 
Attack 
In an eclipse attack, network partitioning is targeted by the adversaries by delaying or 
blocking message forwarding (e.g., transactions) to nodes of the attacked network partition 
to monopolizes the message propagation of the isolated notes to other [61] to eventually 
facilitates double spending. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Selfish-
Mining 
In a selfish-mining attack, a set of nodes mines their own branch of a blockchain without 
publishing their blocks to the main branch until their selfish-mined branch would be chosen 
as future main branch by the particular fork resolution rule [44,53,143] and to, eventually, 
obtain excessive rewards or waste the computing power of honest miners [53]. 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Long-Range 
Attack 
 
In a long-range attack, an adversary targets rewriting the transactions history from the 
genesis block (the first block in a blockchain). A long-range attack is successful as the 
adversary has generated a longer chain than the main chain, which is similar to selfish-
mining [34]. 
DLT designs based 
on PoS 
Sybil Attack In a sibyl attack, an adversary sets up multiple (virtual) nodes to selectively relay 
transactions, which contributes to double spending [112] or to reach majority in a consensus 
mechanism to eventually rewrite the transaction history of the distributed ledger [40,119] or 
(Majority-based) 
DLT designs with 
probabilistic finality 
Routing 
Attacks 
In a routing attack, network messages are intentionally delayed by nodes or network 
operators [7] by the attackers to impede consensus finding or to produce network partitions. 
All DLT designs 
 
A.2 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities 
Name Description 
Overflow/Underflow 
Attacks 
Numbers in smart contracts are usually stored in variables of the datatype unsigned integer (uint). If the stored 
values exceed the maximum uint value (2256) the value will circle back to zero. In underflows, the value of a 
uint variable undergoes zero and circles to its maximum value (2256) [9,58]. 
Unbounded Loops Loops whose behavior is determined by user input and not by a fixed value could iterate too many times, 
exceeding the block gas limit, or becoming too economically expensive to perform, eventually, failing to 
ensure that the smart contract can continue to operate, which commonly leads to a “Denial of Service” for all 
transactions that must attempt to iterate the loop [58]. 
Reentrancy Fallback mechanisms of smart contracts may allow an attacker to re-enter the caller function, which can 
produce unexpected system behavior such as loops of invocations, which eventually run into out-of-gas 
conditions [9,168]. Reentrancy can occur as a single smart contract invokes itself or in a chained execution 
of smart contracts. 
Wallet Griefing A smart contract can cause unexpected errors when invoking external functionality that may itself throw an 
out-of-gas exception (e.g., sending assets from within a smart contract), which eventually locks the smart 
contract [58,154]. 
 
